The Magic World of Stark Young


# THE NEW REPUBLIC

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## To Get America Moving

*Gunnar Myrdal*

## Albania and Her Neighbors

*William E. Griffith*

**TV: Continuing Disaster** *Paul Goodman*

**Nasser's Yemen War** *Patrick Seale*

**Congo Lessons** *Philip Ben*


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# T.R.B. *from Washington*

*Let Well Enough Alone*

★ We are threatened with another era of good feeling. Both men and events seem to be conspiring to bring it about. Since such periods tend to be politically sterile, the prospect is not inspiring: back to the middle Eisenhower years, when the President's let-well-enough-alone position clearly reflected a national consensus. Except for the ugly irrelevancies of Senator Joseph McCarthy, it was a drab period.

Yet even at the time of Eisenhower's greatest popularity, the convening of a new Congress was a fairly exciting event. After 1954, there were always Democratic majorities to challenge the Republican President. True, the challenge never amounted to much because Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson believed in responsible, *i.e.* muted, opposition and the Democratic rank and file was overawed by Eisenhower's heroic image. Nevertheless, the potential was always there in the beginning.

Even the potential was missing when this 88th Congress came to order. Democrats were in nominal control of both branches, having done far better than the party in power normally does in a mid-term election. President Kennedy was riding a wave of national and world esteem whipped up by his success in handling the Cuban crisis.

The nation's enemies, Soviet Russia and Red China, were clawing each other so ferociously that the lacerations would be a long time healing, if, indeed, they could ever be healed.

The resulting situation in Congress was not the kind that invites enthusiastic fault finding. The first manifestation of mildness in the opposition camp was the President's easy victory on the Rules Committee test. It was a limited victory but the White House settled for it. House Republicans were also infected with the virus of moderation despite the best efforts of Charles Halleck, their leader, to immunize them. At their caucus they elected Jerry Ford chairman of their conference in an unheralded revolt of the younger members against the entrenched Old Guardsmen. While Ford is about as conservative as Halleck himself, the Republicans thought Ford would look more moderate on TV.

On the Senate side, the ritual dance over Rule 22, which provides that debate may be limited by two-thirds of the members present and voting, got under way as soon as the opening formalities were over. A bipartisan group of liberals announced that it would try to amend the rule to permit cloture by a majority vote. Southerners immediately went into their filibuster act. Nobody got very excited about it. The liberals were willing to settle for limitation of debate by a three-fifths vote. Whether they would get even that was questionable.

*No More Sacrifices*

★ The President's message on the State of the Union showed that he, too, was on a moderation and good-will kick. Beyond his recommendation of a tax cut, the message was as nearly non-controversial as a Presidential message can be. And even on taxes, the principle will be questioned only by the ultra-orthodox. The reduction has been presold to labor and business. The fighting, what there is of it, will be over details – some of them, to be sure, highly important details.

The over-all tone of the message was optimistic, amiable, almost jolly. As the President explained, "Little more than a hundred weeks ago I assumed the office of President. . . . I pledged no easy answers. I pledged – and asked – only toil and dedication." But now things are different. Now "the state of this old but youthful union, in the 175th year of its life, is good." No more toil and dedication were called for, only tax cuts – the oldest and easiest answer of them all. Except on taxes, there were few specific recommendations. The President was definite about his desire for medicare and a domestic youth corps. He was vague about school aid and civil rights. The expectation among Congress-watchers is that medicare will be started at this session but perhaps not finished. A bill to extend federal aid to colleges probably will be pushed but not one to help primary and secondary schools. The cause of civil rights will be served by Executive action but not by any far-reaching new legislation.

There is, of course, method in the President's mildness. He wants Congress to concentrate on tax reduction, not scatter its attention as the last Congress did. Last year's foreign trade measure and this year's tax reduction bill, he apparently feels, will use up the quota of legislative boldness allowed one President in one term, especially a President determined to preempt the political middle ground. Tax reduction and foreign trade, if his plans work out as he expects them to, will guarantee prosperity in the years just ahead. Atomic arms and alert diplomacy will guarantee peace, the more so if the Communist bloc is split. Given prosperity and peace in the fall of 1964, the President can be sure of re-election.

Resolutions to create a Joint Congressional Committee or a commission composed of Senators, Representatives and citizens to recommend reforms of Congress have a chance this session. Senator Joseph Clark, who once before needled a Senate Committee into holding hearings but got only a negative report, now is getting enough help both in the House and Senate to assure serious consideration of his project.

*Compulsory Arbitration?*

★ Demands for amendment of the labor laws to compel unions and employers to submit serious disputes to arbitration will soon be a feature of Congressional oratory. Conservatives may even succeed in forcing hearings on bills pointing in this direction. Nothing will be done with them at this session unless the President gets behind them, which is highly improbable. However, this is an area in which Congress has sometimes taken the initiative away from the White House. Both the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley amendment to it got their initial impetus from Congress, not the Executive.

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# Sixes and Sevens

President de Gaulle's remarks on January 14 have been interpreted as a rejection of British entry into the Common Market, and as a mortal blow to the "Grand Design" for Atlantic partnership. They are not necessarily either. It has been known from the beginning that he would do everything in his power, short of wrecking the existing Community of the Six, to keep the British out. There are rumors that he is now prepared to go further, vetoing a British application even if the British accept the conditions on which the French are insisting at Brussels. But de Gaulle did not say this last week. On the contrary, he indicated that if Britain would accept French conditions she would be admitted. Thus, the decision seems to remain in British rather than French hands, and the terms remain what they have always been: stiff.

The British have already accepted all the major provisions of the Rome Treaty which governs the Community. The issues on which negotiations have been snagged are, in any long view, comparatively trivial. There has, for example, been a long and bitter argument about how the British should adjust to higher European prices for agricultural goods. The British want to phase in increased food prices. The French suggest they raise agricultural prices at once and provide consumer subsidies to dampen the effect. The British reply that this would be administratively difficult and politically unacceptable. No doubt the British have common sense on their side in this dispute, but the fact remains that the French proposals would raise the British cost of living only about five percent, that this rise will take place eventually even if the British scheme is adopted, and that if membership in the Common Market is worthwhile it will quickly increase wages more than five precent.

The other outstanding issue is whether Britain can in decency abrogate her promises to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal (her partners in the Outer Seven – the European Free Trade Association) not to join the Common Market unless these countries are also offered an opportunity to do so. If Britain joins and her partners can't, they will be deprived of British markets, on which some, notably Denmark, have come to depend substantially. Despite this, de Gaulle demands that Britain join on her own and that other applications then be considered on their merits. This means that the neutrals – especially Sweden – will have rough going. Yet here again, the difficulty may be exaggerated. Once the British were in the Community they would be in a stronger position to ensure that their former

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EFTA partners got in as well. If de Gaulle proved obstinate, there would in principle be nothing to prevent the British from withdrawing. The decision about her partners would, after all, be taken before any significant steps had been made to integrate the British and Continental economies.

No matter how the British try to make it look, then, the decision still seems, as this is written, to be in British hands. Unless the French break off the discussions it seems likely that agreement can be reached and that this agreement, even if it does not contain the concessions the British now seek, would in the long run be economically and politically advantageous to Britain, at least by comparison with any presently contemplated alternatives. The pertinent question therefore is not whether Macmillan can come to terms with the Six, but whether he can obtain terms acceptable to the Parliament or the public. De Gaulle's manner has, however, made the terms he offers less acceptable than they were before.

Nevertheless, Macmillan seems convinced that if he does not do something spectacular to efface the memory of Tory failure in Central Africa, humiliation over Skybolt, and economic stagnation, he will soon be asked to retire to the House of Lords, allowing a younger man to try to refurbish Tory popularity in time for the elections which must be held by October, 1964. Macmillan must therefore be eager to convince his Tory colleagues that whatever terms the Six finally offer at Brussels are good enough. And his colleagues, knowing that another failure will reflect on the Party as well as the Prime Minister, will be eager to believe him.

The Tories' handling of this decision will depend in part upon the opposition they expect in the upcoming election. If Hugh Gaitskell survives his present grave illness they will face a Labour leader of unquestioned stature and competence, and a Party as united as Labour ever is. If Gaitskell dies, he will be succeeded by George Brown, a moderate who has innumerable enemies in the party. Brown is more of a European than Gaitskell, and he might even balk at running on an anti-Market platform. Under his leadership the Labour Party would again be riven by factionalism; the Liberals (who are pro-European) might even become the major opposition force. Then all bets would be off.

Assuming the Tories ultimately conclude that their best hope is to withdraw the Brussels application (blaming de Gaulle) and install a new Prime Minister, would this be a fatal blow either to Britain or to the Western Alliance?

Many economists have argued that Britain could obtain most of the economic advantages of membership in the Common Market in other ways. The bulk of British trade has never been with the Continent, and there is no reason to assume she would be more prosperous if it were. Without membership she would have to face modest duties on industrial goods sold to the Continent, but she could negotiate lower tariffs elsewhere while paying far less for Commonwealth foodstuffs. The economic advantages of joining are almost entirely intangible. It is said, for instance, that antiquated British industry would benefit from a good dose of Continental competition. Competition could, however, be obtained by a unilateral reduction of tariffs, by bilateral agreements increasing Anglo-American competition, or by a vigorous government attack on restrictive labor and management practices. (Unilateral tariff cuts would mean a balance of payments problem, but this could probably be handled, if the US were prepared to cooperate, by bolstering the International Monetary Fund and either devaluing sterling or creating a floating exchange rate.) If a new Prime Minister initiated such changes and continued the government's present expansionist fiscal and monetary policy Britain might well grow as fast and become as prosperous outside the Market as inside. Sweden has.

The most powerful argument for British entry into the European Economic Community has always been political. Both London and Washington fear the political complexion of the evolving European federation if it is dominated by Gaullism. Almost all those who hope to see a continuation of healthy parliamentary systems in Europe have therefore supported British entry. Both the Italians and the Low Countries have been increasingly alarmed by de Gaulle's anti-British and anti-American stance. If this distrust hardens, the chances of further progress toward political union among the Six will become negligible, and even economic integration may be stalled. This being so, it may prove to be Europe, not Britain, which will suffer most if the British application is withdrawn.

# That Tax Cut

Something for everybody is the theme of the tax cut proposal in the President's State of the Union message. Mr. Kennedy offers 26 to 30 percent reductions for those with less than $5,000 annual taxable income. Moving up, the reductions in percentage terms are smaller, but significant, averaging 20 percent in the higher brackets. Coupled with the upper bracket easement is a proposed reduction in corporate income tax to its pre-Korean War level; thus the business and professional ranks are made happy. In consideration of Congress, the President lays aside an appeal for retroactive reductions. He likewise yields to the "budget balancers" by asking for a three-year phasing of the cuts, thus assuring that the effect on the next fiscal year (which begins July 1) will be very small, even if reductions are forthcoming as of July. The $6 billion tax



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bonanza recommended for the next fiscal year will be partly offset, moreover, by tighter income tax regulation (expense accounts, etc.) and increased postal rates. In addition, and very important, Social Security payments will increase by some $1.5 to $2 billion, absorbing even more of the funds released to the spending public by tax reduction.

Is the package a surprise? Only its size – $13.5 billion. But the President, anticipating the long knives of the economy-minded, has given something here too – a figure large enough so that it can be sliced without hurting too much.

What happened to tax reform? The President invites Congress to think about it for the moment; details will come later in the month. Anyway, most of the reforms discussed as possibilities would have a negligible impact on economic growth.

If there is any genuine surprise, it is the remarkable vagueness and contradictory character of Mr. Kennedy's comments on other economic matters. While stating that federal expenditures except for defense, space research and government interest payments, will be lowered or held at present levels, the President hopes Congress will underwrite "imperative" additional programs, including aid for education, a domestic Peace Corps and federal aid for local transportation. We shall have to wait for the Budget to see where the funds for these programs that "we cannot afford to postpone" are coming from, and where cuts in present expenditures will be made.

In general, the State of the Union message reflects the Administration's almost total reliance for fiscal 1964 on stimulating private spending; the accent is conservative throughout. This may seem prudent politically, but it is not prudent from an economic standpoint. It is not the best way to spur growth or to advance the social welfare objectives the President has espoused. An additional dollar spent on washing machines, gin or cars has secondary economic effects; that is, at least some of the dollar will be respent by the person receiving it, and so on. But a dollar spent on education, for example, has many effects beyond the mere multiplication of spending. Dollars for "social commodities" like education almost certainly induce more growth than dollars for personal consumption. The trade-off between federal and private spending, therefore, needs more searching consideration. Which is better depends upon what the people want; but given the President's avowed aims, his proposed program is too heavily weighted on the private and business side of the economy. Some of the funds he wants made available in tax cuts to consumers and corporations ought to be "earmarked" and spent by the government on urban renewal, education and health.

Can Congress commit itself for three years on a phased tax cut given the traditional pattern of annual review of revenue and expenditure? Even if Congress can, will it choose not to review the tax schedule in the winter of 1964? By then, very little of the stimulating effect of the cut will have been felt. At the most, about $3 billion will have been released into the demand bloodstream. At the worst, even this amount will not have been released if the method of cutting is to give tax rebates in February and March of 1964 rather than dropping withholdings from income between July and December of 1963. And if the actual visible effect of the first cut is small by the end of 1963, the Congress may be inclined to take a more critical look at the second year's phase of the program. In addition, one ought to be skeptical of the possibility of holding federal expenditures at or below their present level; the federal deficit is quite likely to be larger than the President anticipates, without any offsetting increase in national income.

A final question. Why is it proposed that tax cuts be phased over a three-year period? Again, economic sense has been subordinated to political expediency: The White House will not risk partisan attacks for having incurred a higher deficit than the highest under Eisenhower. On economic grounds, a two-year schedule would be preferable, simply because a very large chunk of the cut has to come early; if it does not, the economy will not shoot ahead; the Senator Byrds will become even more wary of Kennedy's Keynesianism, making it harder than ever to get America on the road to full employment and full production.

# Tit for Tat

Speaker John McCormack, not the most sure-footed legislative tactician, slipped badly when he decided to sponsor Rep. Phil Landrum of Georgia – an heir apparent to Virginia's Howard Smith as leader of the Southern conservatives – for one of two vacancies on the powerful House Ways and Means Committee. This Committee will consider the President's tax and medicare proposals. McCormack backed Landrum, so it was reported, to assure Georgia's votes for an enlarged Rules Committee. He got all 10 (eight had gone the other way in 1961), only to find he didn't need them.

The Speaker made some phone calls for Landrum, but to little avail. He is no Sam Rayburn. So although Landrum's cause before the Democratic Caucus last week was argued by Carl Vinson of Georgia, James Roosevelt of California (who would move up one notch on the Education and Labor Committee if Landrum went elsewhere) and a machine Democrat from New York, Eugene Keogh, Northern liberals and moderates (and some Southerners annoyed at Landrum's vote on Rules) refused to go along. During the debate



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the Speaker himself, foreseeing defeat, did not speak up on behalf of his candidate. The Majority Leader, Carl Albert, sat in embarrassed silence, aware that Landrum had voted against reciprocal trade, foreign aid, broadened minimum wage coverage, aid to education and even the modest AMA-approved Kerr-Mills Act. The Caucus gave Landrum only 121 votes. Ross Bass of Tennessee (160 votes) and Pat Jennings of Virginia (161 votes) got the two seats.

# Stark Young

The death of Stark Young at the age of 81 is an occasion which we have special cause to mourn. As a writer on *The New Republic* for more than 25 years, he initiated, almost singlehandedly, a tradition of serious American theater journalism which set the highest standards of style, sensibility and judgment for contemporaries and for those who were to follow. Young's writings were animated by a fierce, uncompromising love of art. Confronting a fundamentally impure medium still in its puling infancy in America, he continually elbowed aside the artless and the false, to seek the shimmering and the true, emerging like a diver from a sea of meritriciousness, with a pearl in his hand, and proceeding to describe it in delicate, gracious, emotionally eloquent prose. A Southerner by birth and temperament, Young's sympathies lay mainly with the world's Southland – he liked to praise what he called "Mediterranean" art over what he called the "Teutonic" art – and his appreciations of Molière, Lorca and Pirandello are among the most perceptive of the age, while his Chekhov translations constitute sensitive reinterpretations of this especially beloved dramatist.

Still, Young's personal kinship with the more casual, sunny and diversified art of the South was not a prejudice. His ultimate touchstone was a strong and objective standard of excellence, and he was very much alive not only to the failings, but to the achievements of Ibsen and Shaw. Furthermore, in his understanding of the non-literary aspects of the theater, he had few peers. His analysis of the function of costume, lighting, directing and decor displayed that mingling of practicality and vision which marks the total *homme de théâtre*, and his description of Laurette Taylor's performance in *The Glass Menagerie* along with his evocation of the grace of the great Chinese actor, Mei Lan-Fang (to name only two of his monuments of prose sculpture), resurrect these artists for all time. Stark Young is gone. The theater he served so selflessly throughout his career remains indifferent. But it is Young who lives immortalized with those shadows he loved so well.

# FOREIGN REPORTS

## *Once a Wall, Now a Frontier*

★ On alighting from the train in East Berlin, Mr. Khrushchev hugged Herr Ulbricht and described his Wall as "one of the successes of the German Democratic Republic." In a later elaboration, he said the Wall had given East Germany her frontier and that as a result the conclusion of a peace treaty was not the same problem it once was. It was in this casual manner that the sixth East German Socialist Unity Party Congress shelved the Berlin question and moved on to its major preoccupation with the Chinese. In dealing with the Sino-Soviet split, Mr. Khrushchev left the impression that he was widening the rift while he was narrowing it. Herr Ulbricht, whose sagging regime is supposedly being braced up by Khrushchev's presence, was assigned the task of damning the Chinese for their invasion of India. Khrushchev himself urged them to cease all the "chatter about rocket-nuclear war," rejected out of hand the Chinese demands for a Communist summit, finally suggesting that passions cool awhile, and that differences then be settled in the friendly spirit of coexistence.

None of this could have been of much solace to the East Germans, who can scarcely regard their monumental efforts in constructing the Wall as commensurate with the economic deprivation they now enjoy. Nor did it lighten their misery to have Khrushchev scold them for not producing more, and for listening to Western radio and playing around with bourgeois art. Deprived of the twist, what would be left?

Ulbricht made his predictable demands for an all out effort to achieve German unification, along lines flatly rejected heretofore by the West, though the tone of his speech in this regard was so conciliatory that it has encouraged fresh speculation about new negotiations. He dwelled at length on sketchy plans for increasing industrial production by 8 percent annually between now and 1970, and a 25 percent rise in living standards over the same period. More significant, two days before the Congress opened he sacked Karl Mewis, chief of the East German Planning Commission. This departure clears the decks for fresh economic thinking.

## *No Polaris in Paris*

★ The significance of de Gaulle's rejecting Kennedy's Polaris offer remains obscure. De Gaulle opposes "integrated" nuclear forces on principle, while Kennedy supports them, but neither seems to have much idea how such forces would actually work, and the Nassau proposal apparently contained no hard details. De



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Gaulle's real objection to the Nassau offer was apparently that it would require the French to spend vast sums on submarines and compact warheads, while still leaving them dependent on the US for a vital part of the delivery system, namely the missile. If de Gaulle is to depend on the US he wants more help than was offered. Without such help he will push ahead with his bombers and land-based missiles, though the former will probably be unable to penetrate Soviet air defenses and the latter are unlikely to become operational until after de Gaulle (and hopefully Gaullism) have passed into history. Whether his successors will continue his policies remains to be seen.

### *Togo and Ghana*

★ Ghanaian-Togolese relations have long been strained by Kwame Nkrumah's desire to annex part or all of his tiny neighbor, and by the tendency of exiles from each country to gather in the capital of the other. It was no doubt coincidental that the Ghanaian Government released a white paper indicting Togo for tacit support of a Ghanaian refugee plot to assassinate Nkrumah just a few days before the assassination of Togo's premier Sylvanus Olympio. There is no proof of any intervention by Ghana in the Togo coup, but given Nkrumah's intemperate attitude toward Olympio's regime and the precedent of Ghanaian meddling in Congolese politics during the Lumumba era, as well as evidence now being examined in the Nigerian treason trials suggesting Ghanaian support for those plotters, suspicions will persist. Dahomey was so worried that it cabled Nkrumah requesting him not to intervene.

Togo's new Premier, Nicholas Grunitsky, would not appear on his conservative record to be friendly to Nkrumah's erratic radicalism. The other two leaders in the new Togo regime, Anani Santos and Idrissou Antoine Meatchi, were both associated with the young radical wing of Olympio's party before going into opposition. Whatever their sympathy for Nkrumah, however, they are unlikely to give over Togo to Ghana at a time when political power is within their reach. In any case, they will probably have their hands full for the moment with counter-plots to restore Olympio's party to power, not to mention rising unemployment and declining investment. Whether they will devote themselves to such mundane matters or try to avoid assassins by making the rounds of Africa's innumerable regional economic and political conferences (which Olympio methodically avoided) remains to be seen.

## CAN THE UN AFFORD ANOTHER OF THESE VICTORIES?

# Lessons of the Congo

*United Nations*

To a casual reader of the British, Belgian or French press the UN Secretariat seems to be full of black Africans and yellow Asians, all of them drunk with the Katanga victory and Mr. Tshombe's capitulation, blood-thirsty for more victims, and on the look-out already for new worlds to conquer. To the average reader of the American press, these same UN officials appear as shrewd yet idealistic fighters for freedom, stability and prosperity.

But when one goes to the 38th floor of the glass UN skyscraper, where U Thant presides, one is surprised to find there a fairly small staff, not by any means all Asian or African, not very sure of itself and pleading for sympathy and understanding. The contrast between the reserve and resignation that prevails here and the jubilation of officials in the US State Department is striking.

From the first moment the UN entered the Congo to restore order, one of the chief difficulties was the unreliability of Congolese leaders. What could be done in a country where a pledge, even a most solemn one, is repudiated 24 hours later, where no order is ever executed, where even the most bellicose and fear-inspiring declarations frighten no one?

Yet those on the 38th floor, so prompt to complain about the chaos generated by Tshombe, themselves became a source of confusion. Again and again, one was told of "communications difficulties" between New York headquarters and its Congo branch offices. Some skepticism is called for. Why was every press agency able to receive a message, on the hour, from its correspondents in Leopoldville and Elisabethville? Why was every major American radio network able to carry several times a day a live broadcast from its reporters on the spot? Communications between New York and the Congo are, in fact, excellent. The "bad communications" of which UN officials complained seemed to be a cover for differences of opinion on the 38th floor



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itself; and more important, a cover for the conflicting pressures and counter-pressures to which the Secretariat is exposed.

It is quite easy to make fun of people who one day say that they are not pleased at all that their troops have scored successes and occupied towns and the next day claim that these successes were intended; or to deride them for proclaiming one evening that Tshombe has been put under house arrest, only to deny it the next day with an explanation that he was only under a night curfew. And one can remark on the inconsistency of announcing that Tshombe is free to go anywhere he pleases and expressing dismay the next day about his disappearance.

But it is more important to understand the reasons for such contradictions. The secret of this confusion on the 38th floor is that the small international Secretariat is not and could not be equipped for the task it took on 30 months ago: to serve as the government of an immense country in upheaval; to act as its war cabinet while a war for national unity is being fought.

The controversy raging inside and outside the UN over whether the international organization was entitled under its Charter to intervene in the Congo has not been settled, any more than the future of the Congo itself has been settled. Yet one can already draw some conclusions from what has happened. They are quite different from the official platitudes.

First of all, the contention so often heard in this country, that thanks to UN intervention Russia's designs in the Congo were thwarted, doesn't stand up under careful analysis. Since when is Moscow so respectful of the UN as to stop interfering because a problem has passed into the UN hands? True, the UN has the merit of having closed Congolese airfields to Soviet planes at one time, thus for a while preventing Soviet supplies and men from reaching the Congo. But it was Washington's insistence that Egypt and the Sudan forbid Soviet overflights of their territory which put an end to the Soviet air-bridge. And it was the fact that Antoine Gizenga had not the energy of Fidel Castro which prevented the Soviets from gaining a foothold in the Congo. There are many who say that, left to itself, the Congo would have been a worse place than it is now. That is probably true. But at what price has something worse been averted, and averted perhaps only for the time being? Only a few weeks ago the prospect was that without accomplishing anything substantial, the UN might radically impair its prestige and its finances; and it is still too soon to say that this danger has entirely passed. If policy is the art of choosing the lesser evil, chaos in the Congo with all its grave implications would probably still have been a lesser calamity than the destruction of the UN. It is certainly better to have the UN rather than the US intervene directly in the Congo, but if by putting too heavy a burden on the organization's weak shoulders one risks its collapse, the policy is questionable.

Against this background, the seemingly strange behavior of U Thant in recent weeks becomes less strange. He did not put the UN into the Congo. The mess and the commitment were there when he took over. He knew from his first day in office how dangerous this adventure could be. And because he was not elected to preside over the liquidation of the UN he tried from the start to get out as soon as possible.

It was easier said than done. After all, the world organization could not pull out in defeat. U Thant, who is a very shrewd man behind that benign Buddhist mask, knew that only the US could help him finish his task. He began to collaborate closely with the Americans, disregarding thinly veiled but nonetheless sharp Soviet criticism. At the same time, U Thant must often have felt that the Americans tended to go too far and too fast and were willing to risk too much. After all, if things went wrong the Americans would not bear the responsibility; U Thant would.

Here is the reason for the Secretary General's hesitations, so often displayed in recent weeks. The State Department could announce that Tshombe no longer counted, but U Thant knew that Tshombe still could blow up a dam, submerge hundreds of villages and leave Katanga without electric power for years; he could destroy the Kolwezi mining installations and ruin for a decade the prospect of the Congo's paying its way. No wonder therefore that he was so willing to try once more to reach a compromise with the British, the Belgians, the *Union Miniere*, even with Tshombe. And in all these efforts to find a compromise, in all this maneuvering, he had to deal with giants: the US, Britain, Belgium, *Union Miniere*, Sir Roy Welensky, Tshombe – each disposing of a vast network of paid agents and millions of dollars in official and secret funds. Against all these, U Thant was alone with his few aides, without really first-rate information, without funds, but with immense responsibility.

With US help, he appears to have got through the worst of it. Now that the acute stage of the crisis seems to be over, the UN may begin the task of reconstruction and development for which it is better prepared. (Will the US Congress give money for this? No one else will.) This is the best that could happen, but one doesn't yet know whether it will. One lesson of the Congo is plain, however, as indeed it was almost from the start: no more tasks for which the World Organization is not equipped, whatever urgency those tasks may have. To do otherwise (for instance, to put the UN in charge of West Berlin) would mean choosing the surest road to ruin for the UN and all the prospects it holds out for a less chaotic world. PHILIP BEN



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# The War in Yemen

## *Did Nasser Lure the US Out On a Limb?*

*by Patrick Seale*

President Nasser's armed intervention in Yemen is the most ambitious and dangerous foreign adventure of his career. It has brought him to the brink of war with Saudi Arabia and Jordan and provides American diplomacy in the Middle East with possibly its greatest challenge since Suez. By recognizing, in December, the republican regime of Marshal Sallal – Nasser's protégé in Yemen – the United States has clashed with her British ally and has taken sides in the inter-Arab struggle for power. Why did Washington do it, and what are the military facts?

For the last three months, an Egyptian expeditionary force – put at between 12,000 and 15,000 –has been fighting a savage guerrilla war in north and east Yemen against tribes loyal to the Imamate who will not accept the republican *coup d'etat* by which Sallal overthrew the royalist government. These Egyptian forces – Nasser's crack combat units – were trained for desert not for mountain warfare. Their expensive equipment, their Soviet-built tanks, armored personnel carriers and Ilyushin jet bombers, are not ideally suited for operations in the crazy maze of narrow defiles and boulder-strewn mountains of northern Yemen.

A main road in these parts is a barely discernible single-file, pencil-line camel track linking two waterholes across a moon-landscape of black surging rock threaded by pale dry watercourses. Clumps of white thorn, dry as tinder, spring into flame at the touch of a match to warm the night marches. In this terrain, the slow-moving Nile Valley peasant has proved a poor match for the barefoot, elusive tribesmen armed only with rifle and *jambiya* – the vast, curved, razor-sharp dagger which every male Yemeni wears in his belt.

But quite apart from individual fighting qualities, it was evident (at least to this correspondent from conversations with Egyptian prisoners) that whereas the Egyptians seem uncertain why they are there, the Yemeni tribes are fighting a foreign invader in the name of Islam and of their traditional way of life and form of government – and are enjoying opportunities for loot on a scale probably unparalleled since the incense caravans of Sheba. I met a man who had acquired 80 Egyptian blankets; another had a couple of hundred cans of excellent Egyptian beans; children were dressed in rags of parachute silk and every royalist camp was littered with captured weapons, bazooka bombs, boxes of grenades and Egyptian cigarettes.

The main tracks toward Sana'a from the east and northeast were dotted with Soviet-built trucks and armored vehicles – I counted about 40 – knocked out by royalist mines or by sharp-shooters in hit-and-run skirmishes which have forced the Egyptians to fall back toward the capital. By Christmas, the greater part of the north and east of the country up to within 30 miles of Sana'a was in royalist hands, although the Egyptians still held a number of fortified positions inside this area such as Sirwah in East Yemen and Sa'da in the north; but these were under siege and could be supplied only by helicopter.

Marshal Sallal's republican army, recruited principally from among the peaceable townsmen and peasantry of the south, appears to have withered away, leaving the Egyptians virtually alone to face the tough tribes of the north. Egyptian casualties since the start of operations in early October are soberly estimated at well over 1,000 dead – or around 10 percent of their total force. Losses in vehicles and equipment have also been considerable.

Egypt's undisputed air power has been a difficult factor to appraise. It has been used without scruple but without much skill: several times on each day of my three week visit to royalist areas in December, Egyptian aircraft came over to bomb, strafe and rocket anything that looked like a target: goats, wells, villages and even antiquities such as the ancient dam of Marib. The results have been some damage to royalist morale, considerable hardship to women and children, a restriction on royalist movements during the day, but surprisingly few casualties and little impairment of the tribesmen's ability and will to fight.

As General Kassem of Iraq no doubt discovered in his operations against the Kurds, high-speed aircraft may be a useful psychological weapon in the early stages of a war, but their actual military effectiveness is small against scattered tribesmen unsupported by mo-

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tor transport or heavy equipment. I should add, however, that the Egyptians have been using single-engined Soviet *Yaks* – more deadly in the mountains because they are slow and low-flying – as well as the great silver Ilyushin Badgers that daily fly to the Yemen from Aswan in Upper Egypt with their cargo of bombs.

Southern Yemenis may think highly of their Egyptian Big Brothers, but the indiscriminate and persistent bombing of north and east Yemen has bred among the tribesmen a fierce hatred for Egypt which it will no doubt take a generation or two of peaceful coexistence to erase.

The real leader of the royalist resistance is not Imam al-Badr – in spite of his sensational reappearance in mid-October after being reported dead – but his uncle Prince Saif al-Islam Hasan (Hasan too was said by Yemen's official radio to have been killed in action, but he is very much alive). Pious, fair-minded and with an irreproachable private life, Prince Hasan is the man the tribes are fighting for, and as Prime Minister of the royalist government he provides the political leadership of the counter-revolution.

Prince Hasan has gathered around him a group of reform-minded young princes – his sons and nephews – who have become the principal field commanders in the war. His son, Prince Abdallah bin Hasan, commanding royalist forces on the eastern front, was by Christmas harrying the Egyptians little more than 25 miles from Sana'a. Traveling by camel in the wake of his advance, I saw many Egyptian corpses in desolate mountain foxholes amid a great litter of wrecked vehicles and spent ammunition.

One of the Prime Minister's nephews, Prince Abdallah bin Husein, commands a second tribal army in the northeast, while another nephew, Prince Muhammad bin Husein, has the key job of assembling and dispatching supplies to the various fronts from the Saudi frontier post of Najran. The Imam al-Badr commands operations in the northwest.

No Saudi or Jordanian troops are fighting in Yemen, but the royalists are receiving aid from both these countries. It is a mere trickle – mainly rifles and ammunition – in no way comparable to the massive Egyptian commitment on the republican side. But without this help they could not have taken to the field in such strength nor could they have inflicted such heavy losses on the Egyptians. It is probably also true to say that without still further support and without some heavy weapons, the royalists may find it difficult to exploit their present successes by mounting a decisive assault on a well-fortified position such as San'a, defended by Egyptian tanks, field guns and aircraft.

By the turn of the year, then, most neutral observers of the fighting were agreed (a) that Sallal's republic would not survive an Egyptian withdrawal; (b) that the Egyptians themselves were in embarrassing straits, committed to a grim expensive war with little prospect of victory; (c) that the royalists had scored considerable successes but did not seem to have the weapons or the organization for a really decisive push. This was the situation in which the United States recognized Marshal Sallal's regime.

### *Anglo-American Clash*

America's recognition of the republic in Yemen and Britain's continued reluctance to do so points to a basic difference in Anglo-American policies in the Middle East which has been evident for more than a decade but which is rarely spelled out.

In brief, the divergence stems from the fact that Britain is a Middle East power and America is not. In spite of her withdrawal from Palestine, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq over the last 15 years, Britain is still today the dominant Power right around the southern and eastern shores of the Arabian Peninsula from the mouth of the Red Sea to the head of the Persian Gulf. She is hanging on to these remaining positions of strength because she believes that continued access to Persian Gulf oil is a vital interest, to be defended by force, if necessary (as in the summer of 1961 when Kuwait faced a take-over bid from Iraq).

Some people argue that economic interests are best defended these days by purely commercial agreements unencumbered by political and military controls. This is, no doubt, an admirable principle in times of peace and stability but it would be difficult and hazardous to apply in the present state of inter-Arab warfare. Any British withdrawal in favor of one Arab state would be hotly contested by the others. Rightly or wrongly, current British policy is to use her remaining strongpoints in the Middle East to defend her oil interests against any local threat that may occur.

President Nasser has at times been considered such a threat and so has General Kassem; now Marshal Sallal in Yemen, precariously established, leaning on Egyptian guns and threatening his neighbors with Egyptian rockets, breathes a fire over the neat little Crown colony of Aden and its military base – the lynch-pin of Britain's Middle East defenses. Hence British reluctance to recognize his regime.

America's viewpoint is understandably different. Her Middle East policy is *not* governed by a concern for specifically British interests. It is shaped, if any one principle can be cited, by a desire to restrict Communist influence in the area. In this design, President Nasser has been assigned a prominent role, partly because he has been tough with his local Communists and because he is thought to represent progressive, reformist trends which in the long run are the best defense against Communism, but more particularly because he is considered too important a figure in the Afro-Asian world



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to leave, alone and unsupported, to the tender attentions of the Soviet Union. The American argument, then, is that if America does not help him when he is in trouble he will become wholly dependent on the Russians with dangerous consequences for everyone. Hence, America's massive support for Egypt in wheat, cash, technical assistance and diplomatic backing, particularly in the last 15 difficult months, during which Nasser has been convalescing from Syria's breakaway.

The Yemen is the latest area in which Nasser has needed and has secured US help. What were the arguments behind the United States decision to recognize Marshal Sallal?

One view expressed by some American officials in the Middle East is that the initiative came from keen young New Frontiersmen in Washington, determined at all costs to dissociate America from the old, shaming, "feudal" regimes of Saudi Arabia and Jordan and throw their weight on the side of progress and the forces of history. Another view is that support for Sallal was, in a roundabout way, a pro-Saudi move, intended to "scare" the Saudi Princes into reforming themselves.

A third, more convincing explanation, derived from more authoritative sources, is that the initiative for the American recognition came from US Ambassador Badeau's embassy in Cairo and that it was intended as a rescue operation for President Nasser. The calculation was as follows: American recognition would be followed by Britain's; the Saudis and Jordanians would falter in their support of the Imam; Sallal would breathe freely for a while and, in the lull, Nasser could withdraw his troops with honor, claiming that even the "imperialists" had conceded that Sallal's Yemen republic was firmly established. The operation was presented to the world as an American-Egyptian agreement whereby Nasser undertook to withdraw his forces in return for American recognition. (Actually, Nasser's agreement to disengage was conditional on cessation of Saudi and Jordanian aid to the royalists.)

But something went wrong with the predictions: there has been no lull; Britain has not recognized Sallal; the Imam is determined to press home his advantage and Nasser is faced with the painful dilemma of withdrawing ignominiously or doubling his stakes by throwing in more troops. In the meantime, American diplomacy is out on a limb having secured no *quid pro quo* for its overt support for Sallal's precarious regime.

President Nasser's involvement in Yemen springs directly from the savage feuds which he has been conducting this past year with the Syrian, Jordanian and Saudi regimes. According to the official Egyptian version, the breakup of the UAR in September, 1961, was due not to any shortcomings of Nasser's regime in Syria but to a treacherous, back-stabbing alliance of imperialism and reaction. After this setback Cairo propagandists evolved the doctrine that no further progress toward Arab unity could be achieved until "reaction" had been smashed in the Arab world. This meant in particular the overthrow not only of the "secessionist" regime in Syria but also of Kings Hussein and Saud, and their replacement by Arab socialist regimes on Egypt's model.

# Albania and Her Neighbors

*by William E. Griffith*

The chief preoccupation of Albanian foreign policy since the break with Moscow has naturally been the further cementing of protective ties with Peking. From Communist China the Hoxha regime urgently needs continuing economic aid as well as political protection against a renewed Soviet attempt to overthrow it (either directly or via Yugoslavia) and support within the international Communist movement. It continues to receive both, although Peking's economic assistance is nowhere equivalent to the Soviet and East European aid it replaced.

But the Albanians have lived dangerously too long to relish the idea of having all their eggs in one basket. China, though distant enough to be a safe ally, is almost too far away to afford adequate protection against dangers closer at hand. Furthermore, China's own economic situation is so near disaster that its ability to continue adequate material assistance, less than the Soviets, as it is, is not certain. Under these circumstances Hoxha (the first and to date the only

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head of the Albanian Communist Party) would have to be foolhardy indeed not to see the wisdom and necessity of broadening Albania's sources of economic assistance and of trying, if not to come to friendly terms with its neighbors, at least to keep them divided.

### *"Peaceful Coexistence"*

The Albanian regime has therefore been surveying the possibilities of fruitful diplomatic action. *Vis-à-vis* Belgrade and Athens, both historically Albania's enemies, they are obviously slim: Yugoslavia, Hoxha must with some reason believe, would only befriend Albania the better to eat it up, and the immutable cornerstone of Greece's Albanian policy has been the Greek nationalist demand for annexation of "Northern Epirus." From Hoxha's point of view Italy is the least dangerous (because not geographically contiguous), the least unpopular, and at the same time most able to provide economic aid. Moreover, Italy has always preferred an independent albeit weak Albania to one partitioned or controlled by Yugoslavia and Greece.

Hoxha consequently turned first to Rome. He had already made a preliminary approach to the Italians in May, 1961, and immediately after the Soviet-Albanian diplomatic break Tirana and Rome concluded a new agreement providing for a 50 percent increase in Italo-Albanian trade. (In view of the already large adverse Albanian trade balance with Italy, the new accord perhaps comes closer to being an agreement for aid than for a normal expansion of trade.) The Italian airline Alitalia has opened a line from Rome to Tirana via Bari. Now that the Albanians can no longer travel to Peking via Moscow, they have no alternative but to go via Italy, the Middle East and the Rangoon-Kunming airline into China.

But Hoxha evidently does not intend to limit his efforts toward expanding Albania's Western contacts only to Italy. In an editorial published on January 9, 1962, the central party organ *Zeri i Popullit* declared: "We wish to establish diplomatic relations and to have good trade, cultural, and other relations with all capitalistic countries which want them, especially with our neighbors, on the basis of vigorous respect for the recognized principles of peaceful coexistence. . . ."

In line with this declaration Tirana has proceeded to reactivate trade relations with France, West Germany, the Near East and Africa, to station a permanent ambassador in Vienna (neutral Austria, once a traditional protector of the Albanians against the Serbs and Italians, is now prosperous enough again to resume a similar role if it wished to do so), and to make moves toward better relations with Great Britain. There are, however, no indications of any Albanian overtures for a rapprochement with Washington, and in view of Communist China's implacable hostility toward the US this seems unlikely, at least in the near future.

There have even been some recent indications that Albania and Greece, despite their traditional enmity, may be moving toward an accommodation that would end the official state of war still existing between them. Notwithstanding the reawakening of Greek public interest in the "recovery of Northern Epirus" as a result of Moscow's abandonment of Hoxha, Greece at the same time does not wish to see Italy or Yugoslavia, or both, move into Albania first; indeed, it might even prefer Hoxha to a regime under Italian or Yugoslav control. Athens realizes, moreover, that its major NATO allies would hardly countenance any Greek military adventures in Europe's traditional Balkan tinderbox. As for the Albanians, now dependent solely on the protection of a remote Chinese ally, common sense dictates a desire to minimize the risks in their relations with their neighbors.

The Greek Government has reportedly intimated its willingness to shelve the issue of Northern Epirus for the sake of a rapprochement with Albania. Premier Karamlis stated in the Greek parliament that Athens was prepared to end the state of war between the two countries if a suitable formula could be agreed upon. For its part the Tirana regime has made an initial conciliatory gesture by permitting the repatriation of a number of Greeks who had been in Albania since the Greek civil war. However, another Albanian feeler in late May, 1962, reportedly came to nothing, again because of the Northern Epirus question; and in early September a visit of two Albanian parliamentarians to Greece also did not come off. Nevertheless, both Tirana and Athens appeared in the autumn of 1962 still to desire some improvement of relations.

Of Albania's neighbors, however, Yugoslavia is certainly the one most involved in the new situation created by the Soviet-Albanian break. On the one hand, Tito is totally and permanently hostile to Hoxha, Mehmut Shehu (the present Albanian Prime Minister) and their group, and Belgrade's prestige still smarts from the Albanian Communists' 1949 execution of the Albanian "proletarian" Communist leader, Koci Xoxe, as a "Titoist" and from the failure of Yugoslav-encouraged efforts in 1956 and 1960 to overthrow Hoxha. In addition, there is the problem of the Kosmet region which, with its hundreds of thousands of Albanian inhabitants, constitutes an Albanian irredenta within Yugoslavia's borders. On the other hand, Tito has too great an interest in preserving the Balkan status quo to be disposed to take any flagrant risks. It therefore seems highly unlikely that he will seek to exploit Albania's increased isolation by a new attempt at Hoxha's overthrow, whether by military force or even indirectly by a Belgrade-inspired *coup d'etat*.



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There are, indeed, signs in the contrary direction. Although diplomatic relations between Belgrade and Tirana remain minimal, Yugoslavia has not been content merely with repeated disavowals of any hostile intent toward Albania, but has officially indicated its readiness to normalize those relations and to resume trade exchanges between the two countries. It has also announced a considerably increased degree of autonomy for the Kosmet, presumably in order to counteract any potential tendency among its inhabitants, now that Albania is no longer a Soviet satellite, in favor of rejoining their independent and defiant brethren across the border. On the other hand, trials of alleged pro-Tirana conspirators in the same region have underlined Belgrade's determination to keep the Kosmet within the Yugoslav state. Belgrade probably hopes that the rapidly increasing population and economic growth of the Kosmet will prove increasingly attractive to the Albanians to the south. One may well doubt, however, whether this "supranational" Yugoslav nationalism which Belgrade hopes to create in the Kosmet and make attractive to all Albanians can surmount the extreme ethnic nationalism so typical of any rapidly developing but primitive areas like the Kosmet or Albania itself.

Albania's revolt against Moscow has had the further side effect of reviving historic frictions among its neighbors. Perhaps the most striking evidence of this has been a renewed flare-up of Yugoslav-Greek polemics about Macedonia. While in part this was instigated by overeager Macedonian nationalists in Skopje, and furthered by the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement, the reactions on both sides represent implicit mutual warnings not to disturb the status quo either on the Greek-Yugoslav frontier or in Albania.

### *Balkan Rivalries*

Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, although on the surface improving as a result of Soviet pressure, are far from good (the Macedonian question alone makes any genuine rapprochement very difficult), and Albania may well hope to gain from this historic rivalry as well. These increasing Balkan rivalries, from which Tirana can well hope to profit, were perhaps one of the reasons why the initial Albanian soundings among its neighbors and the West appeared to diminish in early 1962. Hoxha can afford to wait; he is apparently receiving minimum necessary aid from Peking, and the renewal of Albanian economic relations with the East European states indicates that even Moscow has had second thoughts about its initial attempt at total economic blockade.

While Hoxha was executing such a complex minuet on the international parquet, the Albanian internal situation has remained remarkably stable. There has been

*"I was just leaving."*

no reliable evidence of disunity in the Albanian leadership since the late summer 1960; there has been no effective popular opposition since the war.

Nor is the country's economic situation desperate; it seems that the regime has been quite capable of keeping it under control. Its very underdevelopment has been in its favor; with the overwhelming majority of the population still engaged in subsistence agriculture, the replacement of Soviet and East European aid by Chinese (in 1959 China's share of total Albanian foreign trade was 2.7 percent, in 1961 it had grown to 28.2 percent, and for 1962 it has been projected as 59.1 percent, higher than the Soviet Union's share ever was), has enabled most of the key deficit items (primarily industrial equipment and grain) to be met. Furthermore, trade has increased with the West and with uncommitted areas. The inevitable dislocations resulting from such a rapid shift in the foreign-trade pattern do not appear to have produced anything like catastrophic results. This is in part due to the resumption of trade with East Europe, particularly with Czechoslovakia.

Undoubtedly, capital investment and economic growth will proceed at a slower pace than before 1962. This has resulted in a definite decline since 1960 in the Tirana regime's popularity, both within and without the Communist Party. It has also given rise to a fairly



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widespread feeling that, were Khrushchev, Hoxha and Shehu to leave the scene, a renewed Albanian rapprochement with Moscow might be desirable. But such potential party and nonparty dissent does not reach to the Albanian Politburo level, and Hoxha's and Shehu's ruthless elimination of all dissent has produced a climate of terror which could inhibit any immediate effective opposition to their anti-Khrushchev course.

Predictions regarding Balkan politics are best avoided. However, the thermonuclear age tends to freeze national boundaries and to deter – to some extent – even local wars. All in all, the new situation in south-central Europe seems unlikely to erupt into serious armed conflict. On the contrary, provided Hoxha continues to obtain sufficient outside assistance and protection to keep his economy functioning and his neighbors quiet, the present Albanian regime and its policies bid fair to continue to surprise the world and disconcert the Kremlin.

As the Albanian affair has once again demonstrated, ours is indeed an age of nationalism – and not least so in the Communist camp. East and West are both having their difficulties with the diffusion of power so characteristic, it begins to appear, of the fifties and sixties of the 20th Century; Albania, like Yugoslavia, is an example of how badly Moscow can and does cope with the problem.

The Albanian affair is, of course, far from over, nor is it likely to be wound up soon, any more than one of its enabling factors, the Sino-Soviet rift. Any conclusions about it, therefore, must be more than usually provisional. The fact that both Khrushchev and Mao are in their late sixties is the most significant potential factor for rapid change in the world, the Communist camp, and even in Albania.

Yet Albania has been more than just flotsam and jetsam driven by the torrent of Sino-Soviet discord: it has been and is now a factor, albeit a small one, on its own – a small but persistently irritating burr under the saddle in which Khrushchev and Mao are condemned to ride together.

### *The New Elite*

By 1960 thoroughly purged and loyal to Hoxha and Shehu, the Albanian Communist elite had the characteristics of its non-Communist predecessor: the typical ruthlessness of elites in underdeveloped areas and the extreme nationalism of a small, menaced ruling group. It was determined to unite and industrialize the country. It was also more internationalist as a result of a combination of the old Ottoman elite feeling with Western education and Marxist-Leninist ideology. As in Yugoslavia, this new internationalism reinforced rather than conflicted with new Albanian nationalism. Finally, the new Albanian Communist elite had all the pride and self-confidence that comes from having fought their own way to power rather than having ridden into Tirana behind the Red Army tanks.

But by 1960 the Albanian Communist leadership also was suffused with a very special kind of desperation, not surprising in those who twice had nearly been slaughtered by their domestic and foreign Communist foes and therefore quite naturally and most strongly were disinclined to run the same risks again. In 1948 Hoxha and Shehu had been saved from Tito's and Xoxe's firing squads only by Stalin's break with Belgrade; in 1956, almost as surely, they had been saved from removal by the Hungarian Revolution. Both times they escaped from the greatest danger that can befall a small state like Albania: a firm alliance between one or more of its rapacious neighbors and a major power under whose influence they already were.

From the Albanian view, Communist China continues to be as close to the ideal protector as a small, harassed Balkan country can ever expect to have. It is powerful and distant, hostile to the Soviet Union but yet not without influence over it; and therefore capable of maintaining Albania economically, willing to support her against Moscow, and perhaps able somewhat to restrain Moscow against Tirana. It is ideologically strongly anti-Yugoslav, and nothing ever unites an alliance like a common, furiously detested enemy. It is ferociously anti-American, as is Albania because of Washington's aid to Belgrade. Finally, it is far away, and its resources still so limited that it could not, even if it seriously wished, restrain Albania in its search for secondary means of support among its neighbors.

For China, Albania is cheap, its regime apparently stable, its loyalty to extremism unquestioned, its chances of reconciliation with Moscow minimal, its need for a powerful protector total, its possibility of finding another one equally small. Most importantly, perhaps, China cannot afford politically to drop Albania; it could not soon recruit another anti-Soviet ally again.

For the Soviet Union, the Albanian affair represents a loss the unmitigated nature of which is only partially concealed by the much more important, but not, at least as yet, total Sino-Soviet rift. Moscow failed to prevent the Chinese rebellion; it failed to prevent Albania from joining it; it failed to overthrow Hoxha and Shehu; it failed to pressure or persuade China to abandon Albania to Moscow or Belgrade; it failed to beguile or compel the Asian "neutralist" Communist parties to condemn Albania; it failed, above all, to crush a country so small, so Balkan, so poor, so isolated, and to the world at large so nearly ridiculous that Moscow itself ever since has run the risk of being thought impotent.



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# Getting America Moving

*by Gunnar Myrdal*

The American economy seems to have settled down to a sequence of recessions, short-lived and inadequate upturns and periods of stagnation between. If there is any consistent pattern it looks as if the recoveries after the recessions tend to become ever more hesitant and to result in an ever more incomplete re-employment in proportion to the rise in output. I have seen no evidence that would render it probable that the American economy by itself – that is, as a result of the forces now at work in that economy, including present government policies – would get out of this rut.

The famous built-in stabilizers have, until now, prevented the recessions from developing into serious depressions. But such an eventuality cannot be excluded. That a depression would not be permitted to develop into anything like the Great Depression of the 'thirties but would call forth vigorous government action is a statement that does not satisfy me. The policies should have been applied in time to prevent such a depression. Or rather, as the whole pattern of development now established, even assuming that the recessions will remain mild, is unsatisfactory, government policies should be planned and executed in order to set the economy into an entirely new pattern of rapid, steady growth.

When we discuss developments in underdeveloped countries we are accustomed to conceive of growth in terms of the rise in national output per head. But when, instead, we measure the rate of growth in the United States, the USSR, the countries in Western Europe and in the other industrialized regions we are usually less severe and calculate our economic growth quite simply in terms of the increase in national output. This abstention from taking the population development into the calculation of our economic progress is of particular importance in the case of the United States, where the annual population increase is around 1.7 percent, which is a fairly high rate for a rich country. If we properly deflate the average American growth rate in the way we are accustomed to do for underdeveloped countries, the figure for the United States for the last decade comes out at around one percent, actually a lower rate than – on a very hazardous statistical basis – we believe is about the one that poor India has realized during its two first five year plans.

I am inclined to believe that the most important problem in the world today is how to get America out of the automatism of relative economic stagnation. A continuation of the present trend means frustration in its foreign relations as well as in its internal life, which, because of the size and weight of America and the role it has to play is extremely dangerous.

I happened to be an observer at close range during America's great rescue action during the latter part of the 'forties and the beginning of the 'fifties. In that Marshall Plan period the United States had all the power and could have prescribed and enforced any policy in Europe it wanted to have the Europeans to adopt. But the American policy was to hold back and not use its power. It advised the European governments to make up their own minds, promising to support financially any constructive policy they could agree upon. America had its very clear concepts about what then should have been done in Europe. I wrote toward the end of that period that the businessmen, administrators and economists who took a leading part in the rescue mission were among the very best Europeans. But, as I said, in that period of the great dollar shortage, when America had all the power, it largely abstained from using it.

America's relations with Western Europe are now on an entirely different basis. America is well entitled to feel satisfied that its rescue action was so successful that most Western European countries now enjoy a rapid and steady economic growth. Remarkably enough this holds true quite particularly in regard to the initially weakest and most troubled countries on the European continent, *i.e.* those countries that had been overrun by the Nazis and were liberated by the Great Alliance of the US, the USSR and Great Britain – *das neue Europa* of Hitler's dream world. They are still weak in many respects; they have serious unsettled psychological and moral problems to cope with; de-

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mocracy is there not so firmly established as in the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries. But economically they are striding ahead rapidly.

The snag is that meanwhile America itself has lapsed into relative economic stagnation. At present America has good reasons to urge fundamental changes in the policies of its European allies in many and diverse fields. But it has no longer the economic strength for pressing for them effectively. America has even to suppress some of its demands or present them *sotto voce*. This situation is almost the reverse of the one ten or 15 years ago. . . . America is in the danger of losing out as the uncontested leader within the Western world, which is bound to become even more pronounced if the differences in economic growth rate remains. This I regret. In any case it must be contrary to American ideals and interests.

Before I leave the international implications of the relative economic stagnation in America I must also refer to the fact that even that low rate of economic growth is dependent upon very heavy armament expenditures that swallow up half the federal expenditure budget. This is not a healthy situation for a nation that, as I am convinced, is honestly intent upon trying to reach a disarmament agreement. On an abstract level the economists can argue that a major decrease of these expenditures can easily be compensated; I have myself taken part in one of the conferences of economists holding out this prospect. But we should be aware of the real difficulties implied, if there is not a radical change in the way the American people and Congress look upon the role of government in the economy. The difficulties of an adjustment of the American economy to lower levels of armament expenditures are bigger because the growth rate is so low: in a rapidly growing economy a decrease in the armament expenditures could be taken more in stride. And we should not hide from ourselves the fact that the vested interests, working against an international agreement to decrease armaments substantially, must be much more forceful in an economy with underutilized capacity.

### *Unemployment*

The low average level of economic growth during the last ten years, coincides with a particularly rapid, and increasingly rapid technological development which enhances labor productivity. The result is a high and gradually rising level of unemployment. Full-time unemployment now fluctuates around a level of almost 6 percent. This figure will have to be increased by perhaps half again in order to account for the partial unemployment of those workers who are put on short-time employment or who do not bother actively to seek work as jobs are not available. In neither case is the idleness voluntary.

This situation – to which correspond idle plants and machines – is serious as it stands. Add to this that there are several changes under way that, if economic growth is not speeded up, are bound to cause a tendency to even more increased unemployment. With the coming to age of the big batches of children born as a reflection of the full employment during and after the war, the labor force will be growing much more rapidly in the decade ahead than in the last one. The technological progress, the revolutionary character of which is stressed by the common use of the term "automation," is accelerating and is now more and more directed upon displacing labor. So far as material products are concerned a bigger output can be produced with an ever smaller work force. The use of computing machines also will be releasing white collar workers and people on the lower managerial level.

Somewhat less often observed and commented upon is the tendency of the changes now under way, to increase the class chasms in the American society and to stiffen the class structure. The technological progress does not release labor in a uniform way but directs labor demand more and more toward the highly skilled and highly educated. The incidence of unemployment tends increasingly to fall most heavily upon those who for social and economic reasons have lesser skill and education.

The population development under way gives its peculiar twist to this unfortunate situation. Back in 1950, about 2 million American youths reached 18 years of age; now the figure is 3 million and in 1965 it will be 4 million. In the next decade the age group between 25 and 45 will, on the contrary, increase very little; that between 25 and 30 will actually decrease. It is clear that with prevailing and widespread unemployment a disproportionate part of these young newcomers in the labor market will be among the permanently unemployed or live under a permanent risk of becoming unemployed, unless very much larger facilities for education and training are rapidly provided.

In a situation with such big risks of unemployment, even the trade unions are unwillingly becoming instrumental in increasing that substratum of American workers who are unemployed or have only more or less casual jobs. The process of automation is particularly speedy in sectors of the American economy where there are effective trade unions. These unions are thus forced to press for job security for their own members even when this creates incentives for the employers not to engage new workers. In a situation of growing unemployment, the unions often feel their bargaining strength weakened and find it more difficult to take a consistent and strong stand for what from the point



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of view of all American workers and the nation as a whole is the main interest – full employment. They are in danger of being reduced to protective organizations for a number of separate groups of jobholders, which, even if they are all taken together, only represent a minority, perhaps one quarter of the workers. To an outside observer it seems, when everything is taken into account, almost a miracle that big units of the American trade union movement have seen it possible to take such a broad-minded and progressive position on national policies as they have done.

During the Great Depression, studies in many Western countries showed that a very large percentage of those unemployed were so-called "unemployables." Although these "unemployables" rapidly disappeared when the demand for labor revived during and after the war, we cannot in the present state of affairs have confidence that the same thing would happen now, even if we could suddenly and substantially lift the curve of economic growth. For this time, increased labor demand will be directed primarily toward skilled and educated workers, leaving a larger part of the others out. What is now needed, in addition to an upturn of the economy, is a gigantic educational and training program, in the first instance put at the service of the extraordinarily big batches of young people now entering the labor force.

Meanwhile, as long as the present weak trend of economic growth is maintained, the group of badly trained and educated workers hit by actual unemployment or constantly in danger of becoming unemployed, is growing and increasingly set apart from the main stream of American life. Even with increased unemployment benefits their lives are miserable. Indeed they would still be miserable even if generous proposals were acted upon that the involuntarily unemployed should be fully, or almost fully, compensated for the lack of jobs. To be idle and to live permanently on doles is unhealthy and destructive for anybody and particularly for young people without much share in the national culture. This tenet of old-fashioned puritanism I believe to be fully borne out by recent social research. Crime, prostitution and all sorts of shady ways of passing time will thrive, as they did in the slums during the depression years.

Much of the rising unemployment also falls upon minority groups and implies a serious setback in the process of national integration. The largest and still most disadvantaged minority group is that of the Negroes. From about the beginning of the last war there has been a definite trend toward improved race relations in America, a development which is the more remarkable as until then there had for sixty years been no great change in the status of the Negro in America. An important cause among others of this encouraging trend was undoubtedly the high level of labor demand that on the whole was sustained until about ten years ago.

But still Negroes are the "last hired and the first fired." Apart from a tiny upper and middle class of professional and business people, mostly thriving behind the remaining walls of prejudice, and a now considerably larger group of skilled and union protected workers, the majority of Negroes are much poorer and have had less training and education than the average white Americans. They are, consequently, more vulnerable, particularly in the present situation when labor demand is, and must be, more and more turning toward the highly trained and educated.

But to the large number of Negro workers and workers in other disadvantaged minority groups must be added the poor white people everywhere in America who will also be pressed down in this substratum which is excluded from the prosperity of the nation at large and the progress of the American way of life.

### *The Public Needs*

The first and obvious policy conclusion is that the government should take measures which can result in economic expansion. This means, generally speaking, that it should cause an increase in aggregate demand. I believe it to be beyond doubt that there has been a deflationary pressure upon the American economy for at least the last ten years, though with some fluctuations. An increase in aggregate demand can be induced by a great variety of possible policy measures. There is an element of sense in the argument that, as the main thing is to get the economy going at full speed, it is not of great importance what particular policy measures are chosen. The fact is, that there is a very large volume of crying needs which, if they were translated into effective demand, could sustain rapid economic growth for a long time to come. This cannot be done except by government intervention on a large scale.

One category of such needs is, of course, based on the low levels of living of the fifth of the American people who are officially recognized as falling below the poverty line. Another fifth or more of the population do not share to any substantial extent in the abundance commonly assumed to characterize American society. The affluent society is largely a myth, except for a privileged upper stratum.

There is, however, so much solid truth in the appreciation of the technological revolution under way and of the capacity of the American economy to expand production rapidly in almost every field, if a higher growth rate were permitted, that a rise in the living levels of the underprivileged social strata becomes not only a desideratum from a social point of view, but al-



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most a condition for long-term economic advance. Never in the history of America has there been a greater and more complete agreement between the ideals of economic progress and of social justice.

For the purpose of giving more purchasing power to the poorer sections in American society there are a number of re-distributional policy means at disposal. The one that implies least government intervention is, of course, a radical reduction of the tax burden in the lower income brackets. Other means are assistance to organized labor in the weaker sections of the labor market, or increases of the minimum wage level. The high concentration of poverty among certain categories, such as old people, sick people, single mothers or families with many children, is a strong reason to expand the system of social security, a field where America is still far behind the countries that are most similar to it in basic values.

In some respects the government will have to become more directly involved in providing services that are now not available, or not available on a large enough scale. Thus, as the development of technology directs demand more and more toward trained and educated labor, there is need for a much larger public investment in training and education. Particularly in the field of vocational training, America needs a new philosophy. Such training, as is the case with education in general, should not be left to lead to dead ends but should be instrumental in making it possible for young people to move sidewise to other occupations and upwards to higher responsibilities. In the dynamic phase that America has now entered, this is necessary in order that training shall not be wasted.

At the same time there is an urgent need also for a retraining of older workers in order to prevent the emergence of a group of second-class workers who are permanently unemployed or only casually employed. It should be added that only in an expanding economy is there a real chance of successful efforts at rehabilitating laid-off labor or labor in the danger zone. In a situation of widespread unemployment, the retrained will have difficulties in finding jobs, and will slump back in their previous status.

In filling these needs it will be necessary to invest much larger resources in schools and hospitals. But there are many other public investments which are now reasonably neglected. There is no excuse for a rich country to tolerate huge slums in the big cities and lesser ones in the smaller cities at the same time that it allows a large part of its manpower and other productive resources to go to waste.

It is fairly generally recognized by those who have studied the problem that there is a serious and irrational bias against public consumption and investment in America. It is a result of the combination of high-pressure salesmanship for private consumption and traditional suspicion against increasing public budgets. It cannot correspond to what people would really prefer, if they could as readily follow their impulses to buy the means of collective consumption as they can buy private consumers' goods, and if the former were equally well advertised. In the cities, where so much long-term investment is needed to make them really effective as containers of human life and efficient work, this becomes the more serious as now almost the whole population increase goes to swell the number of city dwellers and, in particular, of the big metropolitan districts.

The bearing of my argument so far is that, even if tax cuts can be useful to give a spurt to the economy, sustained economic growth together with many other obvious social objectives will require *very substantial increases in public expenditures*. . . . The role of the government in the American economy will have to be a rapidly and considerably growing one, particularly as an investor in public facilities and a provider of public services . . . This growth of the public sector will necessitate ever more careful long-range planning.

### *Balancing the Budget*

As the primary means for increasing aggregate demand must be decreased taxation and increased public expenditures, the public budget will not be "balanced" in the American sense of this term. At least at the start of an expansionist policy this is clear. Whether it holds good also in later years, when a higher rate of growth and fuller employment have been reached and thus the basis of taxation broadened, is more uncertain. It will depend partly upon the speed by which the government succeeds in increasing public expenditure along the lines suggested, which it must try to do if it wants the rapid growth rate to be sustained.

But the question is not very interesting. The concept of a "balanced budget" in which taxation pays for all public expenditures independently of the character and incidence of taxation and expenditures is an entirely irrational construct, which is nowadays given significance only in American popular and political discussion. What really matters is a "balanced economy," which in different settings – dependent among other things on the size and type of public expenditures and of taxes – may require an "overbalanced," a "balanced" or an "underbalanced" budget. That such a large number of American voters and responsible politicians think in terms of "balancing" the budget is, however, in itself an important fact which decidedly increases the difficulties of rational economic planning and of getting the American economy to expand rapidly and steadily.



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A real risk, however, is that a higher growth rate will overstimulate investments, generally or in certain fields, so that the result is an inflationary development, which under certain conditions may come so fast that sooner or later it will have to be broken by causing a recession. This is contrary to the goal of public policy which must be economic growth that is both rapid and steady. To accomplish this objective will require not only careful planning but also the availability of flexible means for controlling the volume of investment. As monetary controls are clumsy and largely ineffective and as, in particular, the long-term rate of interest in a rapidly expanding economy should be kept low and steady, I would seek policy means in the fiscal sphere, such as taxes adjustable on short notice on energy, on new investment in particular fields, and on consumption. Allowances for capital depreciation as well as for the costs of advertising should also be adjustable. Even if, ideally, such adjustments should be made automatic, reacting to changes in certain indices, their use for stabilizing economic growth would require very much improved long-range planning.

About the risks for inflation I would like to make two general points. First, we now know from recent experiences in many countries that there is no close relation between the rate of economic growth and the rate of inflation. Prices may rise while the economy is lagging, and they may keep steady though it is pushing ahead. Second, in the present stage of American economic development the social effects of a low rate of progress are so grave, particularly in the lower strata, that honesty demands that I should frankly confess that I am prepared to take a moderate rise in prices, if that should be a condition for economic growth.

But I want at once to revert to my first point and assert that I believe the higher utilization of capacity following more rapid growth will tend to lower costs so substantially that inflation is not a condition for economic progress, particularly if the government is prepared to extend its controls over investments and, perhaps, over prices. In regard to price control, I sometimes ask myself whether the American government, which for decades has fought monopoly with such courage and even vehemence by means of legislation and court action, and yet failed to prevent a continuous concentration of market power should not be prepared to tone down its rather fruitless fight against monopoly but instead ask for a share in controlling administered prices, which are so decisive for the general trend of prices.

In regard to the exchange difficulties, it is clear that the fear of losing gold has been a powerful reason for the unwillingness of the American government to venture on an expansionist policy aimed at getting the American economy going at full speed. On this question I have to declare myself a radical heretic. If the American economy were set on the road to rapid and steady growth, this would by itself change anticipations and make Americans less interested in seeking investment outlets abroad and at the same time induce foreigners to invest more in American securities in order to share in American economic progress. American policy has run into a vicious circle where its anxiety about gold losses induces it to be satisfied with the relative economic stagnation that itself is the main reason for the lack of confidence in the dollar.

### *Gold Reserves*

There is in this country, it seems to me, an entirely irrational fixation on the importance of preserving a big gold reserve. If legal and other restrictions were lifted and gold then started to move abroad even somewhat faster than up till now, what would it matter? America's strength, what it is and can be, is produced not by the gold in Fort Knox. Enough of the gold would probably soon come back. Who could be eager to accumulate it? Britain and the underdeveloped countries cannot afford to increase their gold reserves much. France and Germany, which unlike America and Britain have enjoyed rapid economic growth and have been stacking up foreign reserves, would soon find that they have invested too much of their assets in ways that do not pay any interest. And if there is any kernel of truth in old economic theory, bigger gold reserves in these two and a few other countries would tend to increase credits and raise their levels of costs and prices, which would be favorable for America's balance of trade payments and, more generally, work for improved international monetary balance.

This assumes, of course, that big wage increases in the few strategic industries in America whose prices are crucial to the general price development and who also happened to have strong trade unions, can be prevented. In the package deal of policies which should inaugurate the new expansionary epoch, there should be included a promise on behalf of those trade unions to agree to a wage stop for a short time, until the process of economic growth has really got on its way. These unions have such a paramount interest in restoring high employment that such an agreement would be rationally motivated on their part.

If the American government wants to be more firmly assured against a run on its gold, it could give a gold guaranty to those foreign central banks who keep dollar reserves and could even consider giving them for a time a specially high interest rate on these reserves, which should not need to imply a general lifting of the interest levels.

The more basic problem is, of course, achieving a



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more perfect organization of the international money market. The two countries which provide the world with international currency, the United States and Great Britain, have been pressed into deflationary policies at home which are now endangering the stability of economic growth everywhere and not least in the underdeveloped countries. This is basically the problem that Gustav Cassel, my late teacher, friend, and predecessor at Stockholm University, wrestled with after the First World War. Politically he was anything but a radical, and I feel comforted in recalling that my views stated above are not more radical than his 40 years ago. Like him, I would give preference to a simple solution, calling for a minimum of institutional changes as it is always difficult to reach international agreement on beautifully perfected but complicated schemes for international cooperation. This we should be aware of after witnessing the stillbirth of the International Trade Organization which received such extensive prenatal care, and after we have seen the International Monetary Fund functioning on a far more modest scale than was initially planned. That any move toward international monetary stability increases the role of the government in the economy does not need to be stressed.

### *Long-Range Planning*

Among the things that have apparently not changed in America and specifically in Washington is the nearsightedness of politicians and experts; I complained about this twenty years ago in *An American Dilemma.* There is an astonishing number of competent people who can offhand give a detailed and comprehensive analysis of how all important economic indices have recently been moving and how they are likely to move in the months ahead. Everybody is excited about what is going to happen next, who is in and who is out, and who is behind whom. In regard to economic development an altogether undue interest is attached to when the next recession or the next upturn is going to occur, a matter of very little significance to this country or to the world. I will confess that not even as a shareholder do I take much interest in this sort of pastime.

In regard to the long-range development there is a corresponding lack of interest. Long-range planning is almost altogether neglected. This is true even at the universities. Not only the President and the Congress, but also leaders in business are left without that image of what the future holds in store which is needed for rational action, particularly when it implies long-term investment or other decisions which have consequences far ahead. The negligence at the American universities of the long-range prospects and the concentration on short-range issues and also on, by any standards, less important theoretical problems is probably responsible for the conspicuous failure of my distinguished and numerous colleagues to disseminate a reasonable degree of economic understanding to the American people, in spite of the fact that America has a larger college attendance than any other Western country. The superstitions about the balanced budget and the role of gold in the monetary system are cases in point.

What is needed are forecasts of what on different assumptions will happen to the American economy in five, ten, and twenty years' time. . . . The economic forecasts should be worked out for alternative rates of growth and for different directions of policy. They will spell out what is possible, what is alternatively necessary to do in order to reach and maintain a postulated growth rate, and what it will imply in terms of employment and the movement of people, educational efforts, investment, and everything else.

Supervision of a type of programming should be a primary function of the President's Council of Economic Advisors. From the point of view of labor utilization in particular the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the new department for urban problems, which the President has proposed but not as yet got the Congress to accept, all will have a primary interest in this type of forecasting and programming, and from their particular angles many other government agencies would also have it. I see no reason why it should not be a concern of many of the distinguished American universities.

I am wondering why the obvious need of this type of econometric exercise has been so relatively neglected in America and more generally why there has been such a shyness to discuss in a more concrete way long-term trends of the economy and the alternative policy choices that are possible. Is it because to the ignorant and prejudiced it has a Russian and Communist smell? But it is rapidly becoming a regular part of government and business planning in all West European countries. Or is it because it is felt that it invites government meddling with the economy? Such a position is out of step with the needs of the time. For, as I have been attempting to show, there is no hope otherwise of getting America to become again a country with a progressive economy, and of saving America from serious damage to its power in foreign relations and to the internal unity of the nation. Giving the government a greater role in the economy without utilizing the superb intellectual resources which America possesses and now disperses on tasks of much less importance is part of the waste in this country of abundance. Only by painting on the wall in definite and concrete figures the opportunities for a change in policies can America be made to wake up to its old ambitions and the new necessities.



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# The Magic World of Stark Young

## 1881-1963

Dear Mr. Chaplin: You get hundreds of letters every week no doubt, but I have seen your last picture . . . and I must write to say that I hope this will indeed be the last of its kind and that now you will go on to a larger field. . . . You have created one of the great clowns of all time. This Charlie of yours needs no portrait anywhere: he is foolish, pathetic, irrepressible, flickering, comical, lovable beyond all words; he is light as air; he is a blunderer with a heart not solid but worn like a flower on a child's sleeve; a sexless gallantry; he is a tireless curiosity drawn to things as a monkey to a peephole or a moth to a flame; a gentle blithe dreamer and acrobat; a mask; he is a little, grotesque music; a dear laughter carried lightly in everybody's breast; a gay, shy classic; a world figment.

But you have finished your creation. It was perfect long ago. Already it begins to slow down. It shows a falling off in invention and zest; it shows a kind of boredom in you despite the great art with which you sustain the flow of it, the lightness, the airy intensity. Better still it is than all the clowns in the world put together could do, or comic artists anywhere; but it is yet not quite its own best; it is a little weak judged by itself. You have the achievement of it, however, to rest on, whatever happens, whatever you turn to. And you have your own genius and accomplishments to go forward on. The greatest actor in English you are very easily. You have a technique completely finished for your needs so far; an absolute accuracy of the body and the idea, a perfect identification of gesture and intention. You have the musical quality without which no acting is consummate; it appears in your incomparable fluidity of action and in your beautiful, unbroken continuity of style. You have precision and extraordinary economy. You have invention. And – what is the last test – you have been able to give to all this craft and abundance of technical resource that final genius of vitality that makes it really universal, of the people, who long before the critics ever knew of you recognized your credit though your craft was hid from them.

"Dear Mr. Chaplin,"
August 23, 1922

Byron had on the one hand what we may call a social mind that was lively but nearly always conventional; its view of art was contradictory and apologetic; of conduct and morals, sane and stereotyped; it was almost orthodox in its religious difficulties; its powers of reflection were second-rate. But on the other hand he had something in him that was like nature itself; that wrought through him as nature works through the world of matter; something immense, with its own urgency; something essentially free in its action, lucid, and strong, even violent; and uncontrollable save through its own conflicting forces. Against this force in him Byron was always hurling himself. It kept his heart hungry, dissatisfied, restless and disdainful. Down within his own inmost self, it mocked and smashed his conventionalities, cruelly clarified his perceptions, exposed to him his shams, gave him a shameless secret candor and left him an egotism with power but without a genuine consoling vanity. It glorified his art with volume and fire and marred it with impetuosity. It kept him trying to fit himself into ordinary rounds of living and struggling to escape from them. It made him in the smaller and more ordinary moments of life often impossible to admire, sometimes despicable, unfair, impatient, vain and silly; in times of great danger, great causes, needs, scope, it gave him a superb and fatal heroism, a splendid objectivity and common sense and courage. It carried him along and left him solitary and weak and universal. And exactly as Byron himself did, we hurl ourselves against this force in him. It draws and repels us, as nature does, in our own raw secret selves. We envy, love, hate, and fear it at the same time. We want it to make sense, as we want the life in us to make sense, to fit into our choice of thinking. But it remains intractable for us as it did for Byron.

"Byron's Letters,"
September 27, 1922

I read two paragraphs and sat there thinking of Santayana's writing. I thought of its hard glory, its clear outline, its texture of rich and fine mentality. How well he knows too that beautiful and magnificent theory carries with it the obligation to say it completely, to give it the style, the imagery, the movement, the form – in a word – that the soul of it essentially is. Santayana knows where philosophy ends and poetry or religion or mysticism begins; he knows their relationship to life as he knows the



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relationship of philosophy to life. His thought may not be something to found a new gospel on perhaps – I am glad that it is not, there is so much gospel fruit in the land. But when more succulent and evangelical creeds fail one, Santayana may be good to rest upon. With him the mind gets its due noblesse oblige. With him feeling is distinguished and existence aristocratic. "Mad Money," July 19, 1922

Miss Beatrice Lillie comes on in a black dress with the inevitable scarf and tassels around the neck. A high corset like the queen's. A blond head of hair, put up with firm blousiness and a blue ribbon, the blue of turquoise and forget-me-nots. The elbows are angular; the face full of character. She sings, not on the key always, but full of strong attack and matronly strength of will. Various beauties appear in the nature of a chorus, young things not properly clothed. That lady does not yield an inch. She goes on singing, however she may push at them. One of the beauties steps on the lady's train and dislodges it. The beauties tend to walk about and express themselves, not even realizing that this English lady has lost her train. She keeps being rushed out of her place by these creatures, and time after time the line of them carries her to the very edge of the stage. She never gives up, however, and time after time she regains the center of the stage. She forgets the train and leaves it where it lies; but the desire for the center of the stage remains. She disappears for a moment but returns in national colors with a golden helmet. The helmet does not sit well and is worn badly but it is imperial. More beauties appear, with their dimpled knees and silly banners. Britannia breaks through them, drawn by all the power of pride, possessiveness, obtuseness and strong character, to the central point in the attention of that world in front. On the beauties come, line after line, like armies, like the waves of the sea; Britannia meets them all; and, though one of the presented lances pricks her from behind, she comes out in the lead. Britannia will never be a slave, that much is clear; though it is equally clear that nobody wants her to be; all anyone asks is to be allowed to walk about prettily in the sun. Meanwhile there is something winning about her; one likes her, dense, ruddy and selfish as she is, better than Brunhilde or Minerva after all. The wisest burlesque I have ever seen and the subtlest burlesque technique! Miss Beatrice Lillie is a great comic and an astonishing artist, full of impish philosophy and uncanny methods of making points. And it must be said to the eternal credit of the English that no other race could see itself and laugh at itself with so much humor and bludgeoning parody as happens in this skit. "Two Revues," March 12, 1924

Any method, if it happens to be a fresh or unfamiliar form, will trouble the public somewhat, since the dialect used is not easily understood. The public tends to resist it, to jeer or strain away from it, to suspect it of some decadent evil. But if you take the method more or less to itself, without any bother of content to be got at, if you play up the method's novelties and tricks, in other words, dramatize the method's character and ways, you may get something highly diverting and easy. "Commercialize" is the word many people use for this.

"Marketing Expressionism," April 4, 1923

I have seen few things so off, so wrong, as Mr. David Warfield's Shylock in the trial scene, that little, bent, heart-breaking figure of the Jew, with his pious, suffering eyes, fawning, relentless, sharpening his knife, in the midst of that glittering court and in the face of the silly and delightful legal rubbish that the young lady lawyer with her winning glances has to spring on us. I watched Mr. Warfield and was moved deeply, as I have been sometimes when I saw some old, ragged father on the East Side who stood on the corner peddling to the people he despised in his heart trifles that he scorned and who had in his eyes so much goodness, unapproachable fanaticism, patience, tragic silence and distress. But I felt also that the wrong involved was not so much a matter of the play as of life, a part of the tears of things. And what happened to Shylock in this scene seemed not a legal but a kind of natural justice. Biologically, even, it seemed right and necessary that such a creature – no matter what his wrongs may have been – should be defeated. On the side of the Venetian gentlemen, these senators, these lovers and friends, there was gorgeous vitality, beauty, happiness, open love and the desire for happiness, there was generosity, brave passions and prodigal, abounding life. They might be cruel but they were no more cruel after all than the animal world, no crueller than nature. But this creature that they destroyed so gaily, as birds kill one of their kind sometimes – it was not wholly his fault, but the fact remained that he had no dignity, no taste, no style, no health, no beauty, no volume of creative life, he had only pitiful defeat, thwarted mind and purpose, sick wrongs, and dumb, profound, unwholesome intensity. Shakespeare in the riotous, golden brutality and romance of this scene meant nothing of the kind. Shakespeare meant to supply a fight between powers, not a humiliation of humanity.

"The Passionate Pilgrim," January 17, 1923

Pirandello on the whole lacks pathos, except for that pathos that darkens the larger and universal nature of human things; his people are able to reveal themselves so well and with such fluent stress that we are moved more by the things that happen in them than by what happens to them. Except in great poetic drama I know of no people who are so exact and inevitable about themselves as his people are; but the excitement that they stir in us – and in groups they are moving – has not so much an individual warmth and tinge as it has a light shining on it that is cerebral, precise, macabre, tragic, and ironical all together.

Form Pirandello comes often very near to lacking, form in the highest sense, that is, something that belongs to the artist's idea and completes and carries it as his body carries him. It is as if Pirandello wrote easily and fast, seeing numberless profound and keen details as they pour through his brain, but not always in any final outline against his main idea. He suffers often, too, from a certain monotony of recognition, seeing the same kind of element in men and occasions. But he constant-



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ly dilates the region of dramatic expression. He engages and absorbs us by details of experience always slightly varied from what we know in the theater. And meanwhile his genius shows in the fact that, though he may indeed be monotonous sometimes or too special in his interest, Pirandello is never dull. You may be successful in the theater by scenes like Pirandello's, or by such rightly dull scenes as that last act in *Seventh Heaven* or the girl's applauded proposal scene in *Mary, Mary Quite Contrary*, by virtue of genius or of talent; one must have talent to know how to be dull, genius to know how not to be.

"Miss Wycherly's Pirandello,"
October 17, 1923

A work of art is immoral in so far as any part of it is dead, in so far as life is thereby in that part denied. This immorality may ensue from deliberate intention – falsifying the matter to make the work please or sell, distorting the completeness of the artist's vision for false purposes, killing in it, or parts of it, the life that would fill it and make it complete and to be respected. Or the immoral defect may ensue from lack of genius – the artist is unable to create his idea completely in terms of his art and so makes a work that is partially dead. This point covers all in art that is specious – because it distorts the living harmony of the vital attack and mocks reality; prurient – because it shams and itches instead of allowing us the natural purity of all that is alive; cheap and common – because it panders, substitutes and sickens; unimagined and uncreated – because it cannot give a sound body to the soul that is waiting to be born in the work of art. These are what ultimately, without any regard to individual or epoch or geography, make a work of art the enemy of life. "Art and the Moral Life,"
July 17, 1929

The two gifts that Eugene O'Neill up to now has displayed are for feeling and for dramatic image. His plays have often conveyed a poignancy that is unique in the modern drama, you felt that whatever was put down was at the dramatist's own expense. His great gift has been in the creation of images that speak for themselves.

As to the depressing element of *Mourning Becomes Electra*, I have only to say that it seems to me above anything else exhilarating. I trust I will not be thought pedantic when I say that what depresses me in the theater is when the author dabbles in what is deep, enters where he has no right to be, and is glib about what he does not even taste the savor of. I need take no example, the stage is fulfilled; Lavinia follows her direction, the completion of herself and her own inevitable satisfaction are seen. It may be that here life, as the Greek proverb said, wails as to a tomb. There may be other ways to manage, Rotarian healthy thoughts, exercise, good sense, saving the situation, leaving us more cheerful, marching on; but what of that? It is another situation that would be saved. There is a line of Leopardi's where he speaks of "my delight and my Erinnyes"; and once, thinking of the eternal silence, he hears the wind among the trees and goes comparing the infinite silence to that voice, and remembers the eternal, and the dead seasons, and the present and living, and the sound of it, *e il suon di lei*. In this immensity his thought drowns, and shipwreck is sweet to him in such a sea. When the play ended, and the last Mannon was gone into the house, the door shut, I felt in a full, lovely sense that the Erinnyes were appeased, and that the Eumenides, the Gentle Ones, passed over the stage.

"Eugene O'Neill's New Play,"
November 11, 1931

Of all our actors, certainly of all those who have become known, Miss Laurette Taylor could not be called the most cultured, the most versatile in divers styles, the most gracious-minded, but few would deny that she is the most talented. She is the real and first talent of them all. There is an inexplicable rightness, moment by moment, phrase by phrase, endlessly varied in the transitions. Technique, which is always composed of skill and instinct working together, is in this case so overlaid with warmth, tenderness and wit that any analysis is completely baffled. Only a trained theater eye and ear can see what is happening, and then only at times.

"The Glass Menagerie,"
April 16, 1945

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## TELEVISION

# The Continuing Disaster

From its inception in this country, TV has been considered ostensibly as a broadcasting medium. In fact (like network radio but more so) TV has itself been the chief program and product, as well as a peculiar kind of existence; the audience watches TV. The normal concept of a medium is that there is something needful, useful, or excellent to be conveyed, and the medium conveys it. But mostly the formats, ritual, and personalities of TV are what has been conveyed, to some as a way of life, to others as a subject of bile and satire, of which there is a considerable literature. When TV was a technological novelty, this was to be expected, but the continuance of the situation is a disaster. It fills the environment with a monster composed of distractions, lulling routines, and prestige-winners, to enlarge the number of TV-watchers as such, who are then sold to the sponsors like so many pounds of beef.

"The show was pretty good for TV," or "There are good things on TV," or "TV is lousy, how can it be improved?" – people do not seem to realize how extraordinary this form of sentence is. Obviously they do not mean TV but the world of NBC, CBS, etc. It is said there is not enough serious drama on TV or there is too much violence on TV. But the complaint is never posed as a naïve question: "We need serious drama as part of our way of life; how can our TV medium be used to broadcast it?" or, "Since large numbers of people like to watch violent shows, what can we do to solve the psychosexual problems of the country?" It is taken for granted that TV is not ours, and of course, as it has been parcelled out, it isn't. In discussion, the needs of life, society, and art are shunted to the background, but how to cope with "TV" is a subject of lively debate.

Correspondingly, "TV is improved" not by freeing it as a medium to use, but by removing the blemishes of the monster – sex, violence, and puerility – and by making it a more comely monster, better rounded, more generally appealing, higher-toned. Thus, according to a recent homily of General Sarnoff, the present aim of NBC is "to set new standards of program diversity and balance while maintaining a strong competitive position in over-all popularity. . . . Our concept of a balanced and diversified schedule springs from the conviction that a medium addressed to the total public must try to engage the interests of all parts of the public." But is the medium of TV (broadcasting images that somebody might want to see or send) indeed "addressed to the total public," or is it that NBC has cadged so many stations and potential watchers? And what does he propose for that diverse totality? General Sarnoff does not seem to be saying "Here are some important things, rose-gardening, lasers, the Night Court, the debate in the UN; broadcast them." He is saying, "Attract as many groups as possible, to swell the number of TV-watchers. (Is there a *sub rosa* implication that the present audience is getting bored?)

Naturally NBC and the other semi-monopolists who have captured big domains of TV time, equipment and staff regard TV as a self-subsisting proprietary world, to be protected, expanded, and made profitable. It is a commodity (sold by the hour) to be pre-planned, styled, and packaged so as to avoid criticism and be consumed by the widest audience. This proprietary interest is understandable. But somehow TV is *also* a medium for broadcasting the contents of the real world. It is photogenic and can communicate immediate current reality. What happens when a "total public," expecting to be seeing the real world through a medium, sees instead the domain of General Sarnoff, etc.? Inevi-

# The Barnstormer

There are books, it's true
and they are on the shelves
but his most ambitious stab at love
walks in a girl,
and in the south he did not love.

He's under oak or elm
in a corner of his favorite cow
and pasture; he cut a stick
off the very tree another year

the age the boilers blew
and he went upside down
upon a plane's bare struts
and bent to scribble too
while the yellow flames
stoked themselves at night.

Planes were on the ground
at night. The mind went soaring
then. The flames burn still;
the daughter is the least part,
the most corrupted part,
of all his labors; yet,
he'd shovel books into that fire
to let her walk her petulant way
on oleander paths, parasoled
and scared stiff of a chocolate man.

DAVID RAY



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tably, for many, the TV world begins to exist ambiguously as a replacement for the real world. And unfortunately there are even people who do not believe that an event is real if they see it on the street. It becomes real when seen on a TV screen with an official warrant for existence given by General Sarnoff, etc., as part of "balanced and diverse" experience.

Let me put this another way by comparing and contrasting the present state of TV with some comparable media. There are newspapers because there is news and people wish to know it. Not otherwise than the TV networks, the different papers and syndicates try to increase circulation by various features and departments to appeal to the mothers, the kiddies, the sportsmen; and there is no doubt that, like TV-watchers, a vast number of newspaper-readers take in their favorite papers as a ritual, without a lively need to be informed about a particular something or to learn what's new. Yet nobody would dare say that news as such is a product to be styled and preplanned. The ideology is still the scoop, the front page emphasis on the reality of the day whatever it happens to be, the coverage, the accuracy of the reporting. Journalism is a profession because it has a proper subject, the news.

In the publishing of books, every effort is made by the modern publishers, the clubs, the paper-back series, to condition the public to accept a format as if it were a book; there is the Publishing Business just as there is the TV Industry. Nevertheless, the ideology and the tone of book advertising are still that the subjects and authors are what publishing is about. Magazines, of course, have always been strongly colored little worlds of their staffs, whether *The Saturday Evening Post*, *The New Yorker*, or *Blast*; they offer different hypotheses of reality. But they are many, and new formats can enter the field. One would not say, "It's pretty good for *Cosmopolitan*," but would usually just not read *Cosmopolitan*, unless an article was called to one's attention. It is only when we come to *Life*, *Look*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* that the product begins to seem like television, addressed to a potential total public and blandly re-




**If you love children,** your heart will go out to Tommy Littleraven, a 9-year-old American Indian boy who is attending school off the reservation for the first time. Going to school in town frightens Tommy. He is afraid that his non-Indian schoolmates are laughing at his tattered clothing, at his faulty English.

He yearns to join the school club, buy personal books, clothing, go out for a soda with the other boys. But his parents are too poor to give him pocket money. And so Tommy wanders off by himself and dreams that someday he will have the money to do what his non-Indian schoolmates do.

# if you love children

***Make a dream come true!*** You, your school or group can make this dream come true for an Indian child like Tommy. Contribute $10 a month and provide one Indian youngster with suitable clothing, personal books and a cash allowance. You will receive the photograph and story of the child you help and enjoy a warm person-to-person relationship through an exchange of letters. Please give one Indian youngster an even break—and the sense of security and confidence he needs to join the mainstream of American life.

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placing reality with an official reality.

The history of the movies has been somewhat the reverse. Almost from 1915, American movies have thrived on presenting a self-subsisting world, Hollywood and Beverly Hills and their fabulous inhabitants, with an esoteric literature of movie-magazines and ambassadorial press-releases. The cinema has not often been a medium for conveying reality and art, but has been used to help create the reality of the Movies. Nothing else was ever pretended. "The Movies are where your dreams are made." Yet in the films, there has been a continual rebellion – experimental films, documentaries, shoe-string ventures, foreign films, simply to use film as a medium for conveying some other reality than the Movies.

Broadcasting has been cursed by the worst trends of these other media. Economically, it is a great centralized Industry before it has ever been a number of little supply-and-demand businesses. It involves a concentration of investment that must protect itself and exploit its capital-goods and organization no matter whether the products are needed, creating artificial demand and cadging new audiences with gimmicks and slickness, yet remaining unbelievably conservative lest there be four angry letters. Because it deals mainly in formats rather than real thought or creative invention or audience excitement, TV exhausts and discards talents quicker than any other medium, yet gets the most superficial audience response. Like Hollywood, it has been dominated by the dreams of its moguls and is their artificial world; but since there is not even a box-office in contact with the audience, the dreamers are intensely insecure about their image and they draw in their horns because of signs and portents, ratings, the rumblings of possible regulation. Unlike in Hollywood with its extravaganzas, on Madison Avenue the fantasies even of foolish men are levelled to inanity. Although TV pretends to be a medium of news, information, and entertainment, it programs in terms of its own image and a putative audience response, as if the truth of things might not strongly displease audiences and as if creative genius were predictable one way or the other. By a miserable fatality, TV has had the misfortune to develop among a confused and passive populace, starved for stimulation but out of touch with its needs and tastes, many of whom crave any official picture of reality and gobble it up, and most of the rest of whom feel they are powerless to get anything else and take what they get.

This is too beautiful a medium to be thrown away like this. It offers opportunities for the frequent spontaneous emerging of plastic and poetic invention, the rapid dissemination of radical ideas, many kinds of training and instruction, the expression of folk needs, and the development of folk culture. None of this can occur under the present auspices. Regulation can only worsen the disease, making the networks more self-censoring and more self-conscious of their images. It cannot get them into touch with the real, for they are not set up for that. It is evident that the present top-down decision-makers have no notion whatever of what a free medium is.

The best is simply to get rid of them, break up the networks by a complete new deal in the franchises, and decentralize control as much as possible, on any plausible principle, to municipalities, colleges, local newspapers, ad hoc associations. With many hundreds of centers of responsibility and initiative, there will occur many opportunities for direct local audience demand and participation, and for the honest and inventive to get a hearing and try to win their way.

PAUL GOODMAN

## NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Paul Goodman, *a prolific novelist, essayist and poet, is the author of* Growing Up Absurd. David Ray *is on the English faculty at Cornell University.*

## FILMS

# *From Bad to Worse*

*The Bad Sleep Well* (Toho)
*A Child Is Waiting* (United Artists)

The laws of visual perspective apply to artistic judgment, too, unless we are careful; an artist's latest work looms largest. We tend to rank him by it or at least to use it as proof or disproof of what has gone before. If it is not good, and we have disliked the man, we take it gleefully as confirmation. If we have liked the man, we are not only disappointed but embarrassed and may become vindictive because of our embarrassment. Hollywood puts it more bluntly: "You're as good as your last picture."

The last picture by Akira Kurosawa, *The Bad Sleep Well*, is not good. (This is not merely the last to be released here but also, I believe, his most recent.) It is so remote in every way from the mainstream of his work that, except for the opening sequence and the presence of some of his "stock company," there is no internal reason to believe that Kurosawa did it. It could have been made by any experienced, tamely imaginative director of films or television. We have now to remember that lapses can – and often do – occur with good artists, not just in decline at the end of their lives but smack in mid-career. (Bergman's *The Devil's Eye* is another recent, though less drastic, example.) All it means is that to be a good artist is not, necessarily, to be a god. Mistakes are possible for him in choice of subject and method; and once the error is initiated, tenacity in clinging to it as it grows is almost as prevalent among good artists as bad.

Patience and fortitude, the counsel that Mayor La Guardia used to give his radio audience, applies to us. Kurosawa doesn't need that advice. The maker of *Rashomon, Ikiru, Yojimbo,* among others, has little to worry about in the long run.

His new film deals with bribery at the big-money corporation level in contemporary Japan. A young man, whose father was forced to commit suicide in a corporate scandal, has changed his



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
WHAT DO YOU MEAN? A DINNER INVITATION FROM THE WHITE HOUSE AND YOU SAY WE CAN'T GO! ARE YOU CRAZY, MILTON GOFF?
WE CAN'T. IT'S TOO EMBARRASSING. ALL OUR FRIENDS WILL KNOW.
SO? I CAN LIVE WITH IT IF YOU CAN!
CAN YOU, DORA? CAN YOU, REALLY? THAT MR. AND MRS. MILTON GOFF GOT INVITED TO THE WHITE HOUSE THE VERY LAST OF ALL THEIR FRIENDS?
GOOD GRIEF! I HADN'T THOUGHT OF IT THAT WAY!
WELL, PLEASE DO! YOU KNOW WHAT THEY'LL CALL US? THE SECOND LIST GOFFS! AFTER ADVERTISING COPY WRITERS AND AUTHORS OF COOK BOOKS WE GET INVITED! AFTER US THEY ADDRESS THE INVITATIONS TO "OCCUPANT!"
BUT I ALREADY BOUGHT SHOES. AND A GOWN. AND A WIG-
DON'T WORRY. IF WE DECLINE THIS TIME THEY'RE BOUND TO ASK US AGAIN. IF WE GO LATE ENOUGH NEXT YEAR PEOPLE WILL THINK IT'S OUR SECOND TIME.
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SURE-SURE. AND WHAT MAKES YOU SO POSITIVE THEY'LL ASK US AGAIN?
I'LL WRITE TO THE NEWSPAPERS ATTACKING THE PRESIDENT. HOW DO YOU THINK THE REST OF OUR FRIENDS GOT INVITED?
1-6
MILTON GOFF, YOU'RE A GENIUS!
STICK WITH ME, KID. IF YOU WANT TO BE IN, THESE DAYS YOU GOT TO PRETEND THAT YOU'RE OUT.
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name, slithered into the company, become secretary to the chief, married his daughter, and begins to extract revenge. This he does by using another man, supposedly dead, to haunt the guilty and by means of tape recorders, kidnappings, and an assortment of devices that would have discomfited the Warner Brothers in their B-stung days. Only the first sequence, a wedding in western dress at a stuffy wedding hall (which could be in Baltimore or the Bronx), has Kurosawa's flavor. The police make an arrest in the foyer, and panic spreads quietly among the seated dinner guests.

But, after that, hyperdramatic tedium.

The picture's one reward is in seeing Toshiro Mifune young, handsome, and sprucely double-breasted. Those who have watched him as a tigerish medieval bandit, a staunch old general, a frenzied Nipponese Macbeth, a deft 19th-Century thief, or, lately, as a solitary and pragmatic samurai, will at least enjoy marvelling at this leonine actor's magnificent range.

Stanley Kramer again. This time he has produced a film about mentally retarded children called *A Child Is Waiting*. As usual, to criticize him seems to put one on the opposite side from the angels; makes one seem in favor of nuclear war, Nazism, race prejudice, or, in this case, callousness about those born with brain defects.

Much of this picture was made in an institution for mentally maimed children. (There is also one scene in an asylum for adult defectives.) The sight of these children is of course harrowing and, one might even say, properly so. But the film does not use this documentary basis for valid, serious dramatization. It so degrades the truthful setting with movie cliché that the pathos is dissipated and the picture boomerangs on itself. We come away with some resentment that these children have been utilized more interestedly than disinterestedly.

Burt Lancaster plays the dedicated director of the school (and since he only has to be quietly strong instead of overwhelmingly magnetic, he is tolerable). Naturally he has theories of his own that arouse distrust in the state officials to whom he looks for money. Naturally, too, his methods seem to be cruel but turn out to be far-seeingly kind. To his school comes a new music teacher, Judy Garland, who is looking for an emotional refuge after a battered life. In a story that must have been dreamed – or dredged – up between the cheese cake and the coffee at a studio lunch, she becomes maternally attached to one of the boys, is reproved by Lancaster, and disobeys him with dire results, but all ends decently. Through the scenes photographed factually with these tragic children, in the midst of this film that is unafraid to show us life as it really is, Miss Garland wears mascara, false eyelashes, much make-up, and is attended by many misty close-ups.

A sub-plot about a pair of divorced parents has the TV touch of coming ruthlessly to grips with shallow profundities. Gena Rowlands is unobjectionable as the mother. Steven Hill, the father, sounds and behaves like a thug, one of those Actors' Studio disciples who believe that churlishness is the road to emotional truth.

What can be Kramer's rationale for this film? With his others, the do-good reason was clear; but is congenital mental deficiency a soluble problem? If so, no hint of it is offered. If this is a crusade, what is its banner? All the film does is remind us that these children exist and, so far as we now know, will always exist in some numbers. The one plea is for maximum instruction so that the higher-grade cases can learn to take moderate care of themselves and perform some simple function when they grow up. But this plea seems almost an afterthought. More strongly we get the feeling that Kramer has found another good thing: a grim "problem" into which he can move with skin-deep writers, inappropriate stars to insure box office, and the admiration of those who gasp because he is the one producer who tackles these subjects. Or exploits them.

Where will he strike next? Cancer? After the comedy he is now making, why not push on to a cancer hospital? (If you think this suggestion is tasteless, then *ipso facto* you just don't want films to face reality.) Bobby Darin is a young doctor, a brash know-it-all – at first. Judy Garland is a famous singer whose mother has succumbed to the disease and who now wants to devote herself to therapy;



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When Senator Estes Kefauver (Dem., Tenn.) and Senator Barry Goldwater (Rep., Ariz.) *both* urge you to read a book – it's important news. The book is WASHINGTON COVER-UP by Pulitzer prize-winning reporter ***Clark R. Mollenhoff*** and it documents the dangerous abuse of "executive privilege" and bureaucratic secrecy in the federal government; shows how it has, and is, promoting corruption and waste. Sen. Goldwater writes: "The problem of 'executive privilege' has been dealt with skillfully and exhaustively . . ." and Sen. Kefauver calls it "an *important milestone in* the fight for the people's right to know." $4.50

Not since the height of the Islamic era has the Arab world undergone so dynamic a surge of nationalism as in this century. In THE EVOLUTION OF THE MEANING OF NATIONALISM, an eminent Arab spokesman, ***Dr. Munif al-Razzaz,*** explores the changing climate of nationalism throughout Western history; goes on to sum up the current temper of Arab nationalism and to explain the aims of a group of significant and influential states. $2.95

***Burton K. Wheeler,*** the Montana maverick – a Senate storm center for twenty years who's been "accused of almost everything but timidity" – has finally written his autobiography, YANKEE FROM THE WEST. *The Chicago Tribune* calls it "an exciting, unvarnished, first-person story, spiced with anecdotes and observations on Presidents, legislators and Supreme Court justices . . . Readers will learn more about the law-making process . . . from Wheeler's reminiscences than from textbooks on government or political novels." *The Baltimore Sun* comments: "Wheeler's book is a well-written report on a lively half century of American political history, starting from the brawling, boisterous days in a Montana copper mining town . . . We are all fortunate that he is leaving us this record." $5.95

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Sidney Poitier (a *Negro*, see?) is a researcher who has to fight prejudice to get funds. Well, with a little classy music in the background, Darin and Garland meet in a ward full of terminal cases. . . .

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

# Correspondence

## The Phenomenon of Man

*Sirs:*

*Ariadne's Thread* (*NR*, December 22), Louis J. Halle's review of *The Phenomenon of Man* is an honest report of a most difficult book. It is unfortunate that Mr. Halle did not have available for simultaneous review *The Biosphere and the Nöosphere*, by V. I. Vernadsky of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which appeared in the January 1945 issue of *American Scientist*. Earlier it had been published in the *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Sciences*. Vernadsky, founder of Russian geochemistry, states that while lecturing at the Sorbonne in 1922-23 he was influential in the acceptance by Le Roy of biogeochemical phenomena as the foundation of the biosphere. Later Le Roy (1927) and his friend and colleague de Chardin (1925) introduced the idea of the noösphere – a concept which obviously fascinated Vernadsky throughout the remainder of his life. Here we had an important example of intellectual feedback between a Russian (Marxist?) and Bergsonian-tinted philosophers occurring within the Stalin period.

*The Phenomenon of Man* needs no props but I am sure that readers will find reading de Chardin and Vernadsky *as a unit* an enriching experience of a kind that is rarely available to us. Both look at essentially the same basic facts of "life" and mind from somewhat different viewpoints and yet arrive at very similar conclusions: the future is in our hands and we must face it with confidence. Vernadsky is an optimistic, non-mystic de Chardin and certainly not a proper materialist. He wrote: "Here a new riddle has arisen before us. *Thought is not a form of energy.* How then can it change material processes? That question has not as yet been solved."

*Richard Hughes*
*Associate Professor of Geology*
*University of Newfoundland*

***ANNOUNCEMENT***

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## Competition in Air Transport

*Sirs:*

Richard J. Barber's article on airline mergers (January 5) moves me to argue that there is a serious imprecision in much of the discussion of monopoly and competition in air transport. If several airlines are certified by the CAB to fly between a pair of cities previously served by a single airline, it does not follow that competition has been created. The industry is in a compulsory cartel, owing to the CAB's powers of minimum rate regulation; it is non-competitive in any case. Therefore, increasing the number of airlines on a given route will serve mainly to generate excess capacity and to dissipate the monopoly gain in advertising and rivalry in frills of service.

It is usually true that output is higher and prices are lower under a cartel than under a monopoly. The reduction of the Chicago-Los Angeles fare to $85 is a good example. On the other hand, the idleness of resources under a cartel entails a greater welfare loss to society than the malallocation of resources typical of monopoly. It is for this reason that American courts, in their wisdom, have dealt with collusion more harshly than with monopoly under the Sherman Act.

The solution for the non-competitive condition of air transport is not pro-



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liferation of carriers, but an end of minimum rate regulation.

*George W. Hilton*
*University of California at Los Angeles*

## Castroism's Appeal

*Sirs:*

The article written by Mr. John Gerassi entitled "What Is Castroism's Appeal?," which you published in your January 12 issue, is superb! My class on Latin American civilization will be reading and discussing his article within two or three weeks. An order for forty reprints is in the mail. Please give us more articles by Mr. Gerassi on Latin American affairs.

*Enrique Noble*
*Goucher College*

## Is Congress Representative?

*Sirs:*

TRB's "blunt words about the way we are governed" (January 5) sit ill with your much-proclaimed faith in the democratic process, but are adequately explained by one single fact: he is dissatisfied with any method of government – *e.g.*, Congress – which fails to behave according to his wishes.

The "low esteem" in which Congress is held is no lower than that in which all forms of government are held, and it is in its "worst moments" vastly more representative of public wishes than is an Administration which must rent out Madison Square Garden to whip up public desire for Medicare.

Much of what TRB deems "urgent" is in fact urgent only according to his own wishes; further, there is much question whether problems whose solutions *are* urgent are properly solved by the *methods* which he has selected to be urgent: *e.g.*, school aid as proposed. "Weaning Tito and Poland" has, after some three billions, been demonstrated to be not successful or even feasible; any poll of the voting public would by a sizeable margin let both nations sink or swim, adding their dead weight to the economic morass of the Iron Curtain lands, and a Congress which says the same thing is, regardless of your wishes, representative of public opinion. In the last election, Gallup (an unimpeachable source, to a liberal) reported that the elderly, who stand to benefit most from Medicare, voted heavily Republican, that is for the party conspicuously identified as not favoring the proposed Medicare; this would imply that regardless of the existence of analogous plans throughout the world, the Americans allegedly most in need of it did not vote for it, and a Congress returning similarly is actually representative.

*James W. Wiggs*
*Indianapolis, Ind.*


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



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


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


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